I tend to view this somewhat together with the lack of security engineering and policy (including enforcement) at State that allowed Manning to accumulate all t

I tend to view this somewhat together with the lack of security engineering and policy (including enforcement) at State that allowed Manning to accumulate all the data she did. Mind you, I'm not taking a position here on what Manning did, but rather on State's information systems management both before and particularly after Manning's data came out. In the case of Clinton's email server, she appears to have taken no involvement (I debate whether to use the word "interest") to make sure it was "done right". Not understanding the technical details, perhaps, but making sure the people she hired did and did a correct job. I.e. running a proper organization. She was not responsible for State's system being what it was when Manning did her thing (for her, inherited technical debt or whatever you want to call it), but she was the head of State for years afterward. Last I recall hearing/reading about those systems at State, a year or two ago, they were still a mess. Maybe I'm misinformed and/or out-of-date in this. But these days, you can't say "I don't want to know the details" about your information systems and data management infrastructure. At a minimum, as an organizational head you need to ensure that they are being managed properly and securely. And willful ignorance and rubber hosing suspects (figuratively, in prosecutions and the media; perhaps also otherwise) are not effective infosec.