5 ms·
SHA3-256 is quantum-proof, should last BEELLIONS of years
- happyslobro 10y agoThat's a pretty bold statement. A billion years should be enough time to convert the entire galaxy into computronium and deploy all over it. Mind you, the author probably won't be around by then. Probably.
- bluejekyll 10y agoThe article does imply that the sha's can't be cracked for those crazy time periods, though it seems to constrain that to the next generation of quantum computers. It's not stating that at no point in the next billions of years will a different computing platform come along that is capable of doing it. String computing, anyone?
- Bud 10y agoThe main basis for the computation seems to be this: "The paper notes: “The main difficulty is that the coherence time of physical qubits is finite. Noise in the physical system will eventually corrupt the state of any long computation.”" However, just yesterday, I read that new research had once again lengthened the qubit coherence time, this time by a factor of ten. A little quick googling reveals that this time is growing. Rapidly.
- acqq 10y agohttps://eprint.iacr.org/2016/992.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/992.pdf "While our cost model ties us to a particular quantum architecture, we segment our analysis into several layers so that the impact of a different assumptions at any particular level can be readily evaluated." "Our estimates are by no means a lower bound, as they are based on a series of assumptions. First, we optimized our T-count by optimizing each component of the SHA oracle individually, which of course is not optimal. Dedicated optimization schemes may achieve better results. Second, we considered a surface code fault-tolerant implementation, as such a scheme looks the most promising at present. However it may be the case that other quantum error correcting schemes perform better. Finally, we considered an optimistic per-gate error rate of about 10^5, which is the limit of current quantum hardware. This number will probably be improved in the future. Improving any of the issues listed above will certainly result in a better estimate and a lower number of operations, however the decrease in the number of bits of security will likely be limited." Which remains huge for these hashes. In short: "Diffie-Hellman key exchange, RSA encryption, and RSA signatures will all need to be replaced before quantum computers are available. The situation is less dire for hash functions and symmetric ciphers."
- hannob 10y agoThe article is super misleading. First of all it's no secret that quantum attacks aren't a big problem for hash functions, there's "only" a need to switch to longer outputs. The major impact of quantum computers will be shor's algorithm, which affects public key algorithms. But it seems the author of this article also didn't really understand the paper linked. It only looks at preimage attacks. We generally expect hash functions to be resistant to collision attacks, which is a much stronger statement. And here things aren't that rosy. 256 bit algs have by design only 128 bit of collision resistance. Grover's alg reduces that to 64 bit, which is not comfortably secure. Granted, one would need a pretty big cluster of quantum computers to practically break that, but if you go postquantum you should probably better go to 512 bit algs. However none of that changes with this new paper.
- acqq 10y agoAs far as I understand, actually both the hashes and symmetric ciphers will continue to work "after quantum" and "just" increasing the number of bits can be enough to keep them secure. And the whole cryptography can be (re)based on these two? Which doesn't sound too bad, just that some of the now used systems will have to be replaced. But first we have to see how many qubits can technically be kept functioning. Anybody knows the current record? Is it better than March 2016: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=2673 http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=2673 "Briefly, the new work uses Kitaev’s version of Shor’s factoring algorithm, running on an ion-trap quantum computer with five calcium ions, to prove that, with at least 90% confidence, 15 equals 3×5." "In any case, regardless of how long it takes until we can factor enormous numbers like 91, congratulations to the MIT and Innsbruck groups on what’s certainly progress toward scalable ion-trap QC!" It's not 91 bits, it's 91 as the number, that is, 7 bits as a goal, 4 bits (for the number 15) in the successful demonstration.
- JohnStrange 10y agoAES as standard has only up to 256 bit keys, and I haven't followed closely what was going on in crypto lately. Which secure 512 or 1024 bit symmetric encryption algorithm should I use to be 'quantum proof'?
- M_Grey 10y agoIt must be nice, to be able to just say whatever you like, make any claim, with the only requirement being clicks. A little soul-crushing, horribly ignorant and dishonest, but relaxing at least.
- kzrdude 10y agoI'm assuming this article was posted here for laughs.
- kelvin0 10y agoSounds like this famous (although disputed): "640K ought to be enough for anybody."
- cmdrfred 10y agoIf you had the ability to quickly get the plaintext from a hash, dont you have the greatest compression algorithm on earth? Just hash that 10 gig file, send the hash, and have the other machine "break" it. Collisions notwithstanding of course.