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> is fundamentally broken from a security perspective in the relevant dimension (that is, local exploits leading to privilege escalation). I'm not sure why you
by viraptor 10y ago
> is fundamentally broken from a security perspective in the relevant dimension (that is, local exploits leading to privilege escalation).
I'm not sure why you're pointing out containers, Linux, or any specific implementation of anything. What you said seems both true and obvious - local exploits lead to privilege escalation. The only other options are denial of service or information disclosure. All practical systems will have all of those, unless we go into fully verified OS territory.
While I don't strongly disagree with the result, I think this is the wrong way to analyse security of some components. Containers provide abstraction over namespaces. Namespaces isolate some operations (fs access for example), but not others. (syscalls) Whether that improves the security of the system or not depends heavily on the configuration and context. There's a big overlap with the security improvement provided by dedicated system accounts - and that's worth remembering.
But let's not say containers don't improve on security as some absolute statement. There are tradeoffs everywhere.