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Saying that you can only think about abstract things if you have words for them is tautological since abstractions build on language.

coldtea 10y ago
>Saying that you can only think about abstract things if you have words for them is tautological since abstractions build on language. The actual relativist core is not about "only being able to think X if you have words for it" (which is bogus imho), it's about the "language shapes perception" part. Besides, abstractions are not just built on/from language -- else they would be meaningless names. They are based on experiences -- which are not just experiences of actual tangible things but also of circumstances, common feelings, etc. Freedom for example, while an abstract notion, is painfully "tangible" as an experience when its taken away from you, whether you are Japanese or Irish, etc, so one would expect all cultures to form the relevant words to describe it (and that is the case). Thus one could think of freedom even without having access to the word -- just by having in his mind the relevant sensation (as a mental picture, etc). But even more so, a system of language (associated words and notions) also shapes how we approach freedom beyond the basic underlying sentiment.
gmfawcett 10y ago
Abstractions might benefit deeply from language, but I don't see a tautology here. I suspect that anyone who does a lot of abstract thinking (math, software design, visual arts, etc.) spends time engaging with abstractions that have no names or linguistic references, and which may never manifest in named constructs. It can be a relief to have such a "mental thing" become concrete enough to attract a name -- now we have more tools to manipulate it with, and we can communicate it more effectively -- but that doesn't always happen. And when it does, sometimes you have to discard some of the interesting parts in order to wedge the thing into a nameable compartment: it's not really the same abstraction any more. In software design, sometimes I know that I am working within a certain project-specific "space" in my head that informs the decisions I'm making. It has structure, influenced by the structure of the project and by my problem-solving approach; but there aren't any words in there, and I'd be hard pressed to give it a better name than "a mental model." And yet it's a palpable "thing," it's often unique to the specific project, and it is useful in getting the work done -- I definitely notice when I get distracted and lose track of it, and recognize it when it I find it again. I'm trying hard not to sound all fancy and mystical about this -- it's not magical stuff. It's just tricky to talk about kinds of abstractions that don't lend themselves well to being named. :)
Y_Y 10y ago
This is called linguistic determinism, or the strong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and is not widely accepted.

coldtea 10y ago

>Saying that you can only think about abstract things if you have words for them is tautological since abstractions build on language. The actual relativist core is not about "only being able to think X if you have words for it" (which is bogus imho), it's about the "language shapes perception" part. Besides, abstractions are not just built on/from language -- else they would be meaningless names. They are based on experiences -- which are not just experiences of actual tangible things but also of circumstances, common feelings, etc. Freedom for example, while an abstract notion, is painfully "tangible" as an experience when its taken away from you, whether you are Japanese or Irish, etc, so one would expect all cultures to form the relevant words to describe it (and that is the case). Thus one could think of freedom even without having access to the word -- just by having in his mind the relevant sensation (as a mental picture, etc). But even more so, a system of language (associated words and notions) also shapes how we approach freedom beyond the basic underlying sentiment.

gmfawcett 10y ago

Abstractions might benefit deeply from language, but I don't see a tautology here. I suspect that anyone who does a lot of abstract thinking (math, software design, visual arts, etc.) spends time engaging with abstractions that have no names or linguistic references, and which may never manifest in named constructs. It can be a relief to have such a "mental thing" become concrete enough to attract a name -- now we have more tools to manipulate it with, and we can communicate it more effectively -- but that doesn't always happen. And when it does, sometimes you have to discard some of the interesting parts in order to wedge the thing into a nameable compartment: it's not really the same abstraction any more. In software design, sometimes I know that I am working within a certain project-specific "space" in my head that informs the decisions I'm making. It has structure, influenced by the structure of the project and by my problem-solving approach; but there aren't any words in there, and I'd be hard pressed to give it a better name than "a mental model." And yet it's a palpable "thing," it's often unique to the specific project, and it is useful in getting the work done -- I definitely notice when I get distracted and lose track of it, and recognize it when it I find it again. I'm trying hard not to sound all fancy and mystical about this -- it's not magical stuff. It's just tricky to talk about kinds of abstractions that don't lend themselves well to being named. :)

Y_Y 10y ago

This is called linguistic determinism, or the strong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and is not widely accepted.