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Revoking keys (and the necessary checking that it requires) will never work IMHO. The only way to solve this problem is short key signature lifetimes, automated
by okket 10y ago
Revoking keys (and the necessary checking that it requires) will never work IMHO. The only way to solve this problem is short key signature lifetimes, automated signatures and, if compromised, just no re-signature.
Let's Encrypt is one way, although the lifetime with 3 months is a bit too long. One month or even less would be better. Additional verification and checks via DANE/DNSSEC help to shorten the impact of a compromised key. Constant checking for revocations do not. Again: IMHO.
- 0x0 10y agoRoot CAs can't have 3 month validity. Any computer left offline for 3 months, or even 1 day (if coming up close to expiration) wouldn't be able to bootstrap an updated trust store.
- BillinghamJ 10y agoIf you're going to do that properly, why not more like 1 hour?
- ceejayoz 10y agoThat'd be pretty rough if Let's Encrypt had an outage.
- duskwuff 10y agoIt'd also be incredibly hard on Certificate Transparency servers.
- toast0 10y agoA 1 hour server certificate might work if all clients had the proper time set and all libraries were comparing the notAfter to the UTC current time. Sadly, lots of phones and computers have incorrect time settings, off by one hour to work around incorrect DST settings is pretty common, off by several days isn't super rare either. I have run into some SSL client libraries that check notBefore against the current time, in the current timezone, and therefore those in the western hemisphere would fail to work for several hours after a certificate was issued. I imagine they're using the same for notAfter, so those in the eastern hemisphere would stop working early. My rule of thumb is a certificate that is less than 30 days old or has less than 30 days of validity left is going to cause problems for a subset of your users, and shouldn't be used unless you have a good reason (old certificate compromised would be a good reason).
- philsnow 10y ago> The only way to solve this problem is short key signature lifetimes, automated signatures and, if compromised, just no re-signature. I wonder if Let's Encrypt is thinking ahead to a federated future where instead of issuing leaf certs, they also issue intermediate certs to domain owners, who can use those to mint very short-term leaf certificates (like 1-4h) in an automated fashion.
- Natanael_L 10y agoThat would strictly require that all TLS clients correctly handled intermediate certs with a scope limitated to a few hardcoded second level domains. Right now there's barely support for limiting a root CA to a single TLD...