3 ms·

The 'all or nothing' take on security is a very childish or naive point of view. No security system is invulnerable, and even the slightest inconvenience will

The 'all or nothing' take on security is a very childish or naive point of view. No security system is invulnerable, and even the slightest inconvenience will prevent a certain percent of behavior. In light of those two facts, you must speak about specific threats and attacks if you want to say anything about security. For example: Compromised root CAs have not been found to be used by criminal gangs in bank phishing schemes. Therefore, they seem to provide about the right level of security for that threat. Compromised CAs have been strongly implicated in government attacks, so they don't provide an adequate level of security in that context. This doesn't mean they're beyond repair. They work for certain tasks in certain contexts, like your front door, or a safe, or a password, or a security guard.

wtbob 10y ago
> The 'all or nothing' take on security is a very childish or naive point of view. I disagree; indeed, I think the idea that cryptography and security can be flawed-but-useful is itself naïve. If something is breakable, it will be broken; that's why we need to be using the best possible security protocols and standards. > For example: Compromised root CAs have not been found to be used by criminal gangs in bank phishing schemes. They've not been found, which means neither that they've never existed nor that they never will exist.
- eropple 10y ago
  > If something is breakable, it will be broken Whether it will be broken during the duration of your use by an attacker that you can realistically thwart is the question you must be asking, and that has different answers.
  - mSparks 10y ago
    The ability to issue a malicious certificate gives you the ability to instantly mim any https connection. So about as bad as it gets. Worse, because the user is under the impression there is at least some security on the connection which changes their behavior. - for example most users would now not enter financial details on a non https connection. Does anyone know if there is a log stored in windows 10 of what root authorities were used by different domains?
    - eropple 10y ago
      I wasn't talking about this particular concern (which I agree with as being severe). Mine is with the mindset behind "perfect security" leading to worse security, that's all.
      - mSparks 10y ago
        we dont disagree. Pointing out the change in behaviour is just another reason the perfect security mindset leads to worse security.
- unethical_ban 10y ago
  Weaknesses in a system are vulnerabilities. Exploits are the methods used on vulnerabilities. A flawed TLS implementation might only be exploitable by nation states, or only be practical against high value targets. Or perhaps it's known humans are corruptible, but a transparent, auditable root CA is still better than name-your-Chinese-state-CA. Security is a spectrum. It is not all or nothing. Sure, crypto algorithms should strive for perfect security, but a system with humans will be fallible and must be usable.
kpil 10y ago
True. I should not have said 'beyond repair'. But the comparison to my front door is adequate. It is mostly of symbolic value. It is possible to gain entry to the house in 30 seconds. It is at least not possible to just walk in without me noticing when I am at home.

wtbob 10y ago

> The 'all or nothing' take on security is a very childish or naive point of view. I disagree; indeed, I think the idea that cryptography and security can be flawed-but-useful is itself naïve. If something is breakable, it will be broken; that's why we need to be using the best possible security protocols and standards. > For example: Compromised root CAs have not been found to be used by criminal gangs in bank phishing schemes. They've not been found, which means neither that they've never existed nor that they never will exist.

eropple 10y ago
> If something is breakable, it will be broken Whether it will be broken during the duration of your use by an attacker that you can realistically thwart is the question you must be asking, and that has different answers.
- mSparks 10y ago
  The ability to issue a malicious certificate gives you the ability to instantly mim any https connection. So about as bad as it gets. Worse, because the user is under the impression there is at least some security on the connection which changes their behavior. - for example most users would now not enter financial details on a non https connection. Does anyone know if there is a log stored in windows 10 of what root authorities were used by different domains?
  - eropple 10y ago
    I wasn't talking about this particular concern (which I agree with as being severe). Mine is with the mindset behind "perfect security" leading to worse security, that's all.
    - mSparks 10y ago
      we dont disagree. Pointing out the change in behaviour is just another reason the perfect security mindset leads to worse security.
unethical_ban 10y ago
Weaknesses in a system are vulnerabilities. Exploits are the methods used on vulnerabilities. A flawed TLS implementation might only be exploitable by nation states, or only be practical against high value targets. Or perhaps it's known humans are corruptible, but a transparent, auditable root CA is still better than name-your-Chinese-state-CA. Security is a spectrum. It is not all or nothing. Sure, crypto algorithms should strive for perfect security, but a system with humans will be fallible and must be usable.

kpil 10y ago

True. I should not have said 'beyond repair'. But the comparison to my front door is adequate. It is mostly of symbolic value. It is possible to gain entry to the house in 30 seconds. It is at least not possible to just walk in without me noticing when I am at home.