4 ms·
There's still the 25519 curve, whose constants are highly constrained around reasonable criteria. DJB most probably haven't put any backdoor in those. Plus, a
by loup-vaillant 10y ago
There's still the 25519 curve, whose constants are highly constrained around reasonable criteria. DJB most probably haven't put any backdoor in those.
Plus, as far as big number arithmetic goes, it's relatively easy to implement.
- tptacek 10y ago25519 is great. But you can't use it in DNSSEC.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoOh, yeah, standards. I believe someone here said you said one shouldn't rely on DNSSEC anyway?
- tptacek 10y agoWe're on a subthread about DNSSEC, not about curves.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoOops, sorry.
- AndyMcConachie 10y agoIt is being worked on. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update/?include_text=1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-al...
- vabmit 10y agoI just want to point out that the P-curves need not have unique features that allow for more efficient computations during code breaking in order to be "weak" or "backdoored". Simply the fact that the curves are standardized may allow expedited code breaking. We saw this with POISON NUT/CORAL REEF (where specialized hardware (PIQ Blade), pre-computation work, and an otherwise fine small standardized set of primitives allowed for rapidly broken encryption).