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Also DNSSEC doesn't have to use RSA: https://blog.cloudflare.com/a-deep-dive-into-dns-packet-sizes-why-smaller-packet-sizes-keep-the-internet-safe/ https://blog
by jgrahamc 10y ago
Also DNSSEC doesn't have to use RSA: https://blog.cloudflare.com/a-deep-dive-into-dns-packet-sizes-why-smaller-packet-sizes-keep-the-internet-safe/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/a-deep-dive-into-dns-packet-size...
- tptacek 10y agoNo, it's true, you get the choice between RSA and terrifying NIST ECDSA on the terrifying NIST P- curves.
- linkregister 10y agoAs someone who is an amateur at cryptography, are you being earnest or facetious about the terrifying nature of ECDSA?
- tptacek 10y agoBoth ECDSA and the P- curves are terrifying. Not because NIST backdoored either of them, but because they're both comically easy to fuck up. They are last-generation legacy elliptic curve operations. Cryptographers have moved on to significantly better, safer designs. It's 2016 and the vanguard of cryptographic modernity in DNSSEC is P-curve ECDSA --- if you use it, you're taking a risk that some deployed resolvers won't understand your zones. The breaking-change new crypto in DNSSEC is already obsolete.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoThere's still the 25519 curve, whose constants are highly constrained around reasonable criteria. DJB most probably haven't put any backdoor in those. Plus, as far as big number arithmetic goes, it's relatively easy to implement.
- tptacek 10y ago25519 is great. But you can't use it in DNSSEC.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoOh, yeah, standards. I believe someone here said you said one shouldn't rely on DNSSEC anyway?
- tptacek 10y agoWe're on a subthread about DNSSEC, not about curves.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoOops, sorry.
- AndyMcConachie 10y agoIt is being worked on. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update/?include_text=1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-al...
- vabmit 10y agoI just want to point out that the P-curves need not have unique features that allow for more efficient computations during code breaking in order to be "weak" or "backdoored". Simply the fact that the curves are standardized may allow expedited code breaking. We saw this with POISON NUT/CORAL REEF (where specialized hardware (PIQ Blade), pre-computation work, and an otherwise fine small standardized set of primitives allowed for rapidly broken encryption).