2 ms·
" I can't conceal every trace of what my browser is sending, no matter what I do, and so I just accept that I'll be tracked." It's worse than that. I determine
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
" I can't conceal every trace of what my browser is sending, no matter what I do, and so I just accept that I'll be tracked."
It's worse than that. I determined early on in that game that just concealing stuff could be an identifier or profile in itself. The apathy of the crowds, little oligopolies that form in browsers/apps to make them more alike, and creative ways outliers try to be different combine to increase the odds outliers get identified given certain amount of data.
The original way I figured it out was when I was working on deployment strategies for both high-assurance SSL and Tor appliances. They HW/SW architecture should've made them immune to code injection with some protection against leaks. Sounds great right? Wrong. They'd be about the only nodes where the 0-days NSA et al likely had wouldn't work. That would instantly identify them as using the strong stuff. Low volume & niche offering means small enough for close inspection. Few that mattered to enemy would be so low in number so as to be easily targeted with other more personal attacks. Just being bulletproof was itself an identifier that led to them using something better than digital bullets.
Any solutions devolved from the strong security I could prove to a large degree to a cat and mouse game like others were playing but for different objectives. Seems a bit hopeless. Even software immune to hacks has to blend in if you're wanting privacy or dodging attention of nation states. So, the widely deployed stuff also needs that property at least for whatever components you're blending with. Didn't leave me optimistic...