3 ms·
The original message does make dubious claims, but a little later in the thread, the real issue becomes clear. from https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1
by akvadrako 10y ago
The original message does make dubious claims, but a little later in the thread, the real issue becomes clear.
from https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-j-GPACvZw https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-...
"With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then decrypt it with the RSA private key. With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available. Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only environment."
As I understand their argument, if you control the server (and hence private key and cipher suite) you can store the traffic without MITM and later decrypt it if needed. With forward secrecy, that isn't possible.
- ghshephard 10y agoIf you control the server, you can decrypt any time you want, because obviously if you were able to decrypt at one time, you can do so later.
- akvadrako 10y agoThat's the whole point of forward secrecy. For the one session you use a temporary key which can't be recovered later. You can only decrypt the stream if you store that key.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- merb 10y agowell your proxy can just store everything in Plain Text? I mean if you really need to decrypt it later you already saved it somewhere, however you can just store the plain text since your proxy already has that?