3 ms·

Isn't it pretty much standard for such organizations to have decrypting and re-encrypting proxy, with their own CA that clients have to trust? If they do, I do

Isn't it pretty much standard for such organizations to have decrypting and re-encrypting proxy, with their own CA that clients have to trust? If they do, I don't see how forward secrecy changes much, and they just have to tap the plain text from the proxy. If they don't, I'm seriously surprised.

akvadrako 10y ago
The original message does make dubious claims, but a little later in the thread, the real issue becomes clear. from https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-j-GPACvZw https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-... "With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then decrypt it with the RSA private key. With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available. Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only environment." As I understand their argument, if you control the server (and hence private key and cipher suite) you can store the traffic without MITM and later decrypt it if needed. With forward secrecy, that isn't possible.
- ghshephard 10y ago
  If you control the server, you can decrypt any time you want, because obviously if you were able to decrypt at one time, you can do so later.
  - akvadrako 10y ago
    That's the whole point of forward secrecy. For the one session you use a temporary key which can't be recovered later. You can only decrypt the stream if you store that key.
    - deleted 10y ago
      [deleted]
    - merb 10y ago
      well your proxy can just store everything in Plain Text? I mean if you really need to decrypt it later you already saved it somewhere, however you can just store the plain text since your proxy already has that?
yAnonymous 10y ago
You're assuming that IT staff in the banking industry is competent and that they have a good budget to work with, but a lot of evidence suggests that often neither of that is the case.

akvadrako 10y ago

The original message does make dubious claims, but a little later in the thread, the real issue becomes clear. from https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-j-GPACvZw https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1n1tQSGKMBJKsmuCe-... "With TLS 1.2 we can ask the end user to take a Wireshark trace and then decrypt it with the RSA private key. With TLS 1.3 we will have to rely on the SSLKEYLOGFILE feature in Firefox and Chrome, so we want it to be available. Unfortunately, Microsoft does not allow this functionality, which is a problem in a TLS 1.3 only environment." As I understand their argument, if you control the server (and hence private key and cipher suite) you can store the traffic without MITM and later decrypt it if needed. With forward secrecy, that isn't possible.

ghshephard 10y ago
If you control the server, you can decrypt any time you want, because obviously if you were able to decrypt at one time, you can do so later.
- akvadrako 10y ago
  That's the whole point of forward secrecy. For the one session you use a temporary key which can't be recovered later. You can only decrypt the stream if you store that key.
  - deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
  - merb 10y ago
    well your proxy can just store everything in Plain Text? I mean if you really need to decrypt it later you already saved it somewhere, however you can just store the plain text since your proxy already has that?

yAnonymous 10y ago

You're assuming that IT staff in the banking industry is competent and that they have a good budget to work with, but a lot of evidence suggests that often neither of that is the case.