Sure. I think the logic is faulty because it is very specific about implying what sources to trust/not to trust - without motivating that trust/lack of trust o

Sure. I think the logic is faulty because it is very specific about implying what sources to trust/not to trust - without motivating that trust/lack of trust on a logical basis. As such the argument is open to selective application, whereby the party applying the logic decides a priori the result based on their biases about the trustworthiness of the source (and therefore the truthiness of the leaked documents). In this case - in the domain of information warfare - hacks and leaks implicating US officials in foul activity (global surveillance, propaganda programming, election flipping, regime change, torture programs, corruption in election systems) ought not be questioned a priori less or more than leaks implicating non-US officials in foul activity (tax avoidance, e.g. Panama Papers; arming proxy groups that in turn cause accidental casualties, e.g. MH17). Not fully stipulating - in a consistent, logical and sound format - a formal criteria for a comprehensive system to establish and evaluate a priori source trust leaves your logic wholly incomplete, unable to grapple with real world issues of information consumption and investigative reporting. Resulting in what I had said: deeply incomplete, selectively applied logic.