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> Therefore, a CEO will be incentivized to pursue a highly conservative strategy I strongly disagree. A CEO is probably highly personally invested in the comp
by amluto 10y ago
> Therefore, a CEO will be incentivized to pursue a highly conservative strategy
I strongly disagree. A CEO is probably highly personally invested in the company, but that investment almost always has an unusual structure: it resembles a call option, not equity. If a CEO generates a large gain over the course of a few years, the CEO makes a lot of money. In contrast, if the CEO generates a large loss over the course of a few years, the CEO loses very little. This can give a CEO an incentive to make extremely risky decisions because the CEO doesn't personally suffer much more from a huge loss to the company than from a small loss to the company.
This problem exists for investment managers. In a hedge fund that charges a performance fee on investment gains, managers have a perverse incentive to take large risks. It gets more pronounced if the fund is already down for the year: if, say, the fund has taken a 40% loss, it can look very attractive to the manager to bet all of the remaining assets on a coin flip. Heads, they get their bonus. Tails, they now have a 90% loss, but they weren't getting their bonus either way and they lose nothing.
Edit: At least the coin flip is neutral on expectation. But the same issue exists for a bet with negative expected value: the manager gets some benefit if they get very lucky, so the manager has positive expected value even if the fund has very negative expected value from their decision.
- hammock 10y ago>This can give a CEO an incentive to make extremely risky decisions That's the intended effect. You missed the point. Read woopwoop's comment again.
- postnihilism 10y agoI think you need to read both woopwoop and amluto's comments again. woopwoop is saying that the equity compensation given to CEOs is a disincentive for taking risks and that it needs to be offset by a promised severance package in order to increase the variance of outcomes. amluto is saying that this is a mischaracterization of the equity compensation for CEOs, which only exposes them to gains and not losses and thus they are already incentivized to pursue a risky strategy (e.g. golden parachutes are not required to create this incentive).
- hammock 10y agowoopwoop is saying that CEO compensation is structured to benefit the risk-taking CEO no matter how well his risks pay off ("generous severage package" if they don't pay off, "generous benefits" if they do). amluto is saying CEOs are exposed only to gains and not losses, which is agreeing with woopwoop without realizing it. The reason a BoD/shareholders would want to set up a CEO with such an arrangement is because the much wealthier shareholders are well-diversified and risk-seeking (they don't depend on their income from this one company to feed their family)- while the CEO is not as diversified, he DOES depend on his compensation from this one company to feed his family- so if the BoD/shareholders expect him to take risks, then he needs to be protected from the consequences of those risks.
- supster 10y agoActually hedge fund managers tend have a large portion of their net worth invested in the fund also.
- andrewprock 10y agoOnly the new ones.
- amluto 10y agoEven when this is true, it doesn't necessarily solve the problem. Say you're 28 years old and you're running your first fund. You have a net worth of $500k (because you worked 100-hour weeks as a banker for a few years, paid your student loans, and saved up). You put $400k into your fund and raise $50M. You charge a 25% performance fee. If you get 10% returns, that's $1.25M for you (at a possibly low tax rate, too) plus $40k on your own investment. If you lose 20%, you're out $80k. What's your incentive here?
- Animats 10y agoRight. That's pay for volatility. Huge problem. Worst case: Pacific Gas and Electric before and after deregulation. Before deregulation as a public utility, a century of modest profits and modest CEO pay. After deregulation, wildly volatile profits ending in bankruptcy three years after deregulation, and much higher CEO pay.
- WalterBright 10y ago> Tails, they now have a 90% loss, but they weren't getting their bonus either way and they lose nothing. Except that their investors will flee (cash out) and they'll not be getting any management fees next quarter.
- amluto 10y agoThey'll cash out anyway -- a 40% loss is pretty bad, too. Also, apparently having a famously bad investment track record doesn't make it much harder to raise money for a new fund in the future. If I remember right, the LTCM managers kept right on going after LTCM blew up.
- phlipski 10y agoIn hindsite - LTCM should have been the canary in the coal mine. They got bailed out to the tune of about 4 billion. Sounds like chump change after 2009.... And the banks are STILL too big to fail. If they truly are too big to fail then banks should be regulated like utilities used to be. What will it take before a majority of this country realizes that? Another 2009?
- jwatte 10y agoIt will take a collapse of the moneyed politics, probably through bloody revolution, for this to change at this point.
- guy_c 10y agoA suggested solution is 'career shares'. The CEO is required to hold shares granted from incentive scheme until retirement. Incentivising them to develop long-term value - http://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk/about/people/65/Brian/Main http://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk/about/people/65/Brian/Ma... I'll try and remember the name of UK CEO that successfully extracted £200m in incentive based remuneration over a ten year service. A service that saw the share price boom in early years, then by the end of the 10 years crash to below the starting price.
- guy_c 10y agoA suggested solution is 'career shares'. The CEO is required to hold shares granted from incentive scheme until retirement. Incentivising them to develop long-term value - http://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk/about/people/65/Brian/Main http://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk/about/people/65/Brian/Ma... I'll try and remember the name of UK CEO that successfully extracted £200m in incentive based remuneration over a ten year service. A service that saw the share price boom in early years, then by the end of the 10 years crash to below the starting price.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]