3 ms·
This doesn't seem all that secure. Against an Evil Maid attack, your best mitigation is to be able to keep everything, OS and all, on a portable drive which is
by lightedman 10y ago
This doesn't seem all that secure. Against an Evil Maid attack, your best mitigation is to be able to keep everything, OS and all, on a portable drive which is self-encrypting; essentially an encrypted PE.
- saynsedit 10y agoWhy not? Seems secure against evil maid to me (barring hardware backdoors like Intel).
- howardbeware 10y agoThey explicitly address several attacks here: https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl#specific-attacks-and-mitigations https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl#specific-attac...
- saynsedit 10y agoNone of those are evil maid attacks.
- talltower 10y agoLet me state a section of our product description here, detailing the way we are approaching the "Evil Maids" USB volume boot blocked at BIOS, BIOS access controlled by security key + PIN, Intel TPM is enabled, and we do not enter a passphrase to unlock encryption (unlike software based full disk encryption) In addition, attacks that don’t rely on booting to a USB device are protected by powering off the USB interface when the user keyfob is out of range More details here: https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=Resources#Resources https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=Resources#Resource...
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- startling 10y agoDoes that work? Can't the evil maid install a malicious hypervisor to dump interesting pieces of memory every few minutes?
- lightedman 10y agoThat hypervisor would have to be at the hardware level, I'd imagine. A read-only PE for boot (WORM drive) with all your typical programs pre-installed, and then a separate encrypted removable data drive would be the mitigation against that.
- startling 10y agoAnd the BIOS?
- lightedman 10y agoBIOS is not part of an evil maid attack.