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ORWL – The first open source, physically secure computer

• SRSposter 10y ago
  its great that the hardware privacy front is progressing
• Cieplak 10y ago
  Enjoy spending the next 10k years auditing the security of the chipset with your scanning tunneling microscope.
  • murbard2 10y ago
    Even if it doesn't protect yourself against some transistor level NSA backdoor, that doesn't mean it can't thwart other attackers who would usually take advantage of physical access.
• na85 10y ago
  I scowled when I read about the Intel chip, and I stopped reading when they mentioned USB. Assuming for a moment that there's no hidden backdoor in the Intel chip (which seems exceedingly unlikely from all that I've read regarding IME, not to mention the un-auditable microcode), all this fancy hackery is still going to get pwned by BadUSB. Secure computing cannot and will not move forward until we have a way to mitigate against this.
  • michaelmrose 10y ago
    I had a very similar thought. Also hdmi can double as ethernet. DVI uses a serial bus to negotiate features if I'm not mistaken. Probably room for exploits over that port too. Seems like using built in input and display and giving up some external ports would be the only reasonable strategy if you were being as serious about physical security as this wants to be.
  • nickpsecurity 10y ago
    You simply can't have a secure computer if untrustworthy chips are in the TCB. They did say open-source, physically-secure computer. They didn't say the whole thing was secure. The use-case is whatever security you usually have plus tamper-resistant case, drive encryption, better authentication, and whatever Intel's extensions bring to the table. Better than regular computer in terms of defending against many more attack vectors. Assuming design works. Also, such a device can be combined with a secure, open computer to divide risk up among software and physical attacks.
  • wiml 10y ago
    They address this a bit. Their CPU supports device virtualization and the default OS install dedicates a VM to just the USB ports, and the USB data lines are electrically disconnected from the HCIs when the machine is in locked mode. I'd be more concerned about the wifi and bluetooth chips' firmware.
• JoachimSchipper 10y ago
  Having some physical security in a OSS-hacker-compliant form factor is really quite nice. This is not going to replace a proper HSM, and almost certainly is a less secure place to store your data than an iPhone; but it's a good start for those unwilling to give up on (the performance of) PCs. It's worth noting that QubesOS, which is supported by this system, protects against e.g. USB-based attacks by running a virtualized Linux for just the USB port (simplified.) This has its limitations, but should be pretty decent. If at all possible, try to ensure that this device is powered down when an attacker gets it. Several attacks are easier if that's not the case (e.g. USB-based attacks, but also cold boot attacks on the encrypted disk - the security monitoring should trigger when one opens the case, but if an attacker can still extract your disk password from RAM before the RAM fades you're in trouble...)
  • deleted 10y ago
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  • tajen 10y ago
    Why is it potentially less secure than an iPhone? Attackers can't scan the RAM because of the enclosure, whereas they might do so on an iPhone, correct?
    • VoidWhisperer 10y ago
      Correct me if I am wrong, but if that was possible, wouldn't the FBI have had a lot less of a challenging time getting the data off of that guy's phone?
      • krapp 10y ago
        They didn't have a challenging time, they just paid some hackers to do it[0]. What they wanted was to set a legal precedent[1] which would allow any law enforcement agency to force manufacturers to subvert the security of their devices on demand. [0]http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-fbi-idUSKCN0XI2IB http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-fbi-idUSK... [1]https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/25/fbi-director-james-comey-apple-encryption-case-legal-precedent https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/25/fbi-direc...
• Dzugaru 10y ago
  > If someone has physical access to your computer with secure documents present, it’s game over! Err, why? Is AES encryption not sufficient? And the key is secure in my head - not something someone could steal. So, why is this even a thing?
  • ge0rg 10y ago
    Unless you also want to perform the AES operations in your head, you have to rely on the hardware and software of your computer to perform them. An attacker could then replace the AES routine you use with one that stores a shadow copy of your key, or exfiltrates it over some covert channel.
    • gravypod 10y ago
      What if the crypto side of things is remove-able and carry-able on your person? Or what if it could be subdermally implanted so you know no one can pick pocket you and replace it? Just a thought.
      • JoshTriplett 10y ago
        > What if the crypto side of things is remove-able and carry-able on your person? You might as well have the entire computer removable and portable.
        • howardbeware 10y ago
          And that's pretty much what ORWL is.
    • Dzugaru 10y ago
      Well yeah, but this assumes I don't know the fact the physical access had place and proceed to enter the passphrase revealing the key unawaringly afterwards. If this is what "having physical access" means - then yes, I agree, game over, and ORWL solves it. But if I know the attack took place (FBI broke into my house, the computer is locked in a safe etc.) - the data should be secure.
• zitterbewegung 10y ago
  Not sure why the ubuntu.com is linked instead of the crowd supply link which has all the information including the ability to purchase one. See https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl
  • sctb 10y ago
    Thanks, we updated the link from https://insights.ubuntu.com/2016/09/29/meet-orwl-the-first-open-source-physically-secure-computer/ https://insights.ubuntu.com/2016/09/29/meet-orwl-the-first-o....
• JohnStrange 10y ago
  "When tampering is detected, ORWL immediately and irrevocably erases all your data" IMHO that is beyond stupid, it's criminally irresponsible. Well, to be fair, perhaps there are some uses cases, just not many. I'd rather go with tamper-proof seals instead.
  • masukomi 10y ago
    how is it "criminally" irresponsible on a personal computer? I should be able to delete my own data whenever i want to, unless ordered by a court not to. Also OpenBSD has had the ability to wipe the system on failed password attempts for many years now.
    • JohnStrange 10y ago
      It's criminally irresponsible to sell such a computer, because it will easily result in data loss and not all users are educated enough to understand the consequences of such a flawed "security" design. Of course, you can claim that it's ultimately the customers fault in this case, and I agree, but they should nevertheless expect some lawsuits. There is always a tradeoff between security and data integrity, something which the people who downvoted my post apparently don't understand. When even your mom can mount a 100% successful denial of service attack with a screwdriver, then you're screwed. If you disagree, I challenge you to show me a use reasonable case that couldn't also be solved by actual physical security or by locking down booting and the BIOS and using tamper-evident seals.
      • jamesgeck0 10y ago
        It's not illegal or irresponsible to sell a computer that deletes data when tampered with when "deletes data when tampered with" is _advertised as one of the primary features of the machine_.
        • JohnStrange 10y ago
          I agree "criminally irresponsible" was the wrong choice of words and I rightly got flamed for it.
• brian_herman 10y ago
  How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/ https://libreboot.org/faq/
  • teaearlgraycold 10y ago
    Didn't know about this. They should have gone with AMD.
    • mordocai 10y ago
      https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd. ARM maybe?
      • Cyph0n 10y ago
        ARM has TrustZone.
        • monocasa 10y ago
          TrustZone is, for practical purposes, a little more open if you're the one designing the board. Most of the time, the crypto is opt in, and you as the final assembler control the keys.
        • subway 10y ago
          TrustZone alone is much closer to a SecureBoot or TPMish feature than ME. It's possible it would allow implementation of an ME-like software stack running inside the TEE. It's worth mentioning that there is at least one OSS implementation of a TEE software stack, OP-TEE, making this even less of an issue. Assuming your device/soc mfg doesn't lock you out. http://www.linaro.org/blog/core-dump/op-tee-open-source-security-mass-market/ http://www.linaro.org/blog/core-dump/op-tee-open-source-secu...
    • calcifer 10y ago
      AMD has it too: https://libreboot.org/faq/#amdpsp https://libreboot.org/faq/#amdpsp
• verandaguy 10y ago
  It's an interesting concept, for sure – but could someone more knowledgeable than me explain whether this leaves the system vulnerable to the potential, alleged backdoors present in Intel's chips via the Intel Management Engine?
  • talltower 10y ago
    Our long term plan is to limit ME capabilities using the BIOS configuration. We just released the SOW of the 1st BIOS with Eltan on the WiKi. https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=File%3ASowDESIGN-SHIFTORWLPUBLIC20160902.pdf https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=File%3ASowDESIGN-S... We are planning to investigate how to further limit ME capabilities with Eltan and we will update the SOW as we make progress. We also believe that the current secure micro controller implementation severely limit the ME capability through power management and the SSD key management.
  • jonathanstrange 10y ago
    No need for that, you just pawn it via USB.
• betolink 10y ago
  Great project! but unless the computer is used to do only offline tasks then having a physical key is as useful as locking a door and leaving the keys on (hardware level backdoors, zero-day attacks, lack of end to end cryptography etc.)
• lightedman 10y ago
  This doesn't seem all that secure. Against an Evil Maid attack, your best mitigation is to be able to keep everything, OS and all, on a portable drive which is self-encrypting; essentially an encrypted PE.
  • saynsedit 10y ago
    Why not? Seems secure against evil maid to me (barring hardware backdoors like Intel).
    • howardbeware 10y ago
      They explicitly address several attacks here: https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl#specific-attacks-and-mitigations https://www.crowdsupply.com/design-shift/orwl#specific-attac...
      • saynsedit 10y ago
        None of those are evil maid attacks.
        • talltower 10y ago
          Let me state a section of our product description here, detailing the way we are approaching the "Evil Maids" USB volume boot blocked at BIOS, BIOS access controlled by security key + PIN, Intel TPM is enabled, and we do not enter a passphrase to unlock encryption (unlike software based full disk encryption) In addition, attacks that don’t rely on booting to a USB device are protected by powering off the USB interface when the user keyfob is out of range More details here: https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=Resources#Resources https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=Resources#Resource...
      • deleted 10y ago
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      • deleted 10y ago
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• saynsedit 10y ago
  Appreciate the fully secure boot process, even if the Intel situation isn't fully secure. Wish I had an external uC with burned-in firmware on my machine that I trusted to verify my BIOS firmware and orchestrate the boot process.
  • talltower 10y ago
    Thanks. We agree with your statement fully. We are raising the threshold of entry to your personal data substantially, but we are still far from perfection. We did a number of steps up in the security ladder. We are also taking steps to minimize ME abilities in ORWL. Our long term plan is to limit ME capabilities using the BIOS configuration. We just released the SOW of the 1st BIOS with Eltan on the WiKi. https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=File%3ASowDESIGN-SHIFTORWLPUBLIC20160902.pdf https://www.orwl.org/wiki/index.php?title=File%3ASowDESIGN-S... We are planning to investigate how to further limit ME capabilities with Eltan and we will update the SOW as we make progress. We also believe that the current secure micro controller implementation severely limit the ME capability through power management and the SSD key management.
• DenisM 10y ago
  I wonder how realistic it is to get the simplest ARM design and make "your own" chip? I mean there should be blueprints somewhere, if you could ask someone to make a small batch of these chips? It would be too small to be worth it for someone to inject a backdoor into it. Or you could make that into an FPGA... Am I talking nonsense?
  • monocasa 10y ago
    If you're going to go through the process of taping out your own chips, RISC-V is probably your best bet at the moment.
• uxcn 10y ago
  ORWL was designed specifically to prevent undetected tampering with any of its electrical components, including the entire motherboard and storage drive. When tampering is detected, ORWL immediately and irrevocably erases all your data, even if it is unplugged at the time. and... Upon any tampering, the secure microcontroller instantly erases the encryption key, causing all data on the SSD to be irrevocably lost. If only the key is deleted, wouldn't that leave the drive susceptible to brute force?
  • pstrateman 10y ago
    Uhh.. yes but enjoy brute forcing a 256 bit key. See you in a few trillion years.
    • libeclipse 10y ago
      Quite a lot more than a few trillion.
      • jsudhams 10y ago
        Isn't brute force a chance? Should it not be "see you in next minute to few years?"
        • deleted 10y ago
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        • rtkwe 10y ago
          It's all down to probabilities, yes our hypothetical attacker could guess your key correctly the first time or within a few years but the chances are so tiny it approaches zero for practical purposes on practical timescales.
      • dmichulke 10y ago
        You have to account for Moore's Law within the few trillions GP mentioned
• jimmytidey 10y ago
  Isn't the phrase Evil Maid a bit off-key? I'm sure this must have been discussed at great length elsewhere. We could express the same idea without the power and gender relations implied.
  • na85 10y ago
    Sure, but it's an industry trope now. The same way we use Alice, Bob, and Eve as everypersons when talking about communications.
  • dogma1138 10y ago
    Evil maid or the "cleaning man scenario" is a pretty standard term. Also technically whilst it does originate from maiden it is mostly gender neutral today, just like busboy or a bodyman are.
  • nickpsecurity 10y ago
    It's the common name of the attack that people get. So it's useful whether PC types, who are a tiny minority of many audiences, like it or not. I'm not sure how "Evil Maid" label was derived. I do know from espionage reading that the most common form of the attack came from maids in hotels of business or government people passing through. Janitors and maintenance types, too, but they were in a trusted, protected building instead of a third party's. French intelligence is particularly notorious for using maids or other hotel employees. Calling it a (adjective-here) Maid attack given all the maids involved makes since for historical and current significance of that attack vector. As in, the label is also a reminder to watch your ass and never leave gear unattended in hotels. ;)
    • jimmytidey 10y ago
      DSK conspiracy theories are a fun example of French intelligence services in hotels. Certainly, the phrase has a titillating James Bond aspect to it. If you haven't heard the phrase before it sounds weird, I do understand it's not intended maliciously. I don't think I'd use the term without quotes in my own writing.
• j2kun 10y ago
  Where does the name come from? When pronouncing it I can't help but notice it's very close to "Orwell"
  • valine 10y ago
    Considering their video starts off with a quote from George Orwell, I would say the pronouciation is intensional.
  • wastedhours 10y ago
    In their post on the Ubuntu blog [0] they say it is pronounced "or-well". Assumedly ironically. [0] https://insights.ubuntu.com/2016/09/29/meet-orwl-the-first-open-source-physically-secure-computer/ https://insights.ubuntu.com/2016/09/29/meet-orwl-the-first-o...
  • Archi1 10y ago
    The name is from Orwell as you guessed. The idea is that we need an open source computer that protect privacy to enable freedom of speech ;-)
• Animats 10y ago
  This appears to be a good solution to the wrong problem. Maybe if they team with someone working on secure computer software...
  • nickpsecurity 10y ago
    I thought that, too, but decided to give them credit for an open solution to a hard, neglected problem. Let's face it: we need parallel developments in each of these areas since nobody is going to do all of them. It's good so long as the pieces can be securely composed by an integrator later. Just like the old incremental MLS paper or Karger's smartcard project. A piece at a time, even if extra time or cost on individual pieces, increases odds high-security product will emerge in long-term when each parties' interest (or funding or management) is often short-term. If they were serious, I'd say work with Genode team for FOSS or partner with Sirrix to port their TrustedDesktop system to it. Both are using models with low TCB's and trusted paths architecturally similar to B3/A1 systems. Turaya used by Sirrix is basically Perseus Framework with pre-built drivers, VPN, disk crypto, management software, etc. Batteries-included. Here's Perseus: http://www.perseus-os.org/content/pages/Overview.htm http://www.perseus-os.org/content/pages/Overview.htm I think a port of TrustedDesktop to ORWL-like solution would be a nice start on secure desktops for businesses or individuals willing to pony up dough. Can use something like Genode once it gets mature enough with necessary components. I've moved on from separation kernel stuff to HW-centric security but combining a thing that works with one that might seems like a good default for now. So, a Turaya-like product combined with ORWL. I'll add requirements of parsers auto-generated LANGSEC-style with any TCB code run through SAFEcode or Softbound+CETS at a minimum. Kernel on bottom is seL4 or Muen (SPARK). Drivers done statically in subset of C or SPARK amendable to thorough analysis. Would that strategy for rapidly getting a high-security product out the door address most of your expectations or exceed them?
  • deleted 10y ago
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  • eeZah7Ux 10y ago
    Kudos to the open source design but they should not encourage users to run windows on it.
• calebm 10y ago
  I was very recently looking into physically secure computing solutions, and the "industry standard" seems to be the SafeNet Network HSM, formerly Luna SA Network-Attached HSM (for example, it's what Amazon uses for their CloudHSM service: https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/ https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/), which costs like $30,000. With that number in mind, the ORWL price of $700 is quite enticing!
  • talltower 10y ago
    Yes, HSMs are very expensive and after talking to a few people in this industry we got the impression, some of the ORWL features are not present in HSMs. Like the ability to Geo-lock the device using the key (mounted in the ceiling). Waling away with the device will render it useless as the keyFOB is missing.
• 0xdeadbeefbabe 10y ago
  By the way, making other people secure is big business. For that reason I can see a pointy haired decision maker buying loads of these for the functionaries to use. I wouldn't really want one of these for myself though.
• qplex 10y ago
  Remember to put glue into the USB ports.
• nornagon 10y ago
  > The battery itself is projected to last about six months without being connected to power. It seems like a lot of the security of the device depends on active scanning (e.g. the LDS clamshell mesh, the IMU, the temp sensor, etc.), which stops working after 6 months. Is the vector of a malicious actor taking the device and waiting 6 months before breaking in considered not worth protecting against?
  • wiml 10y ago
    The webpage says it zeroes the key material when the battery runs low. So it'll fail "secure" in that case, presumably.
    • nornagon 10y ago
      Ah, I missed that bit! Thanks :)
• nickpsecurity 10y ago
  In a rare event, I actually like what I see here. They've clearly studied prior designs in high-security space, likely HSM and smartcard mitigations. The mesh enclosure strategy was adopted by older HSM's. There were potential bypasses that led to even more features, esp membranes and radiation sensors. The best ever made, per Ross Anderson's team of talented IC breakers, was IBM's 4758 whose protections and potential attacks are described here: https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv2-c16.pdf https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SEv2-c16.pdf Best route is just to clone that thing somehow. IBM themselves already depreciated it in favor of a new product. Might still try to patent sue you or pull some other crap but worst case should be Chinese clones becoming available after new design is published. :) Designers of ORWL should try to copy more of the IBM thing's techniques to close gap between the two. Far as design itself, I like that it's relatively simple, leverages a secure IC, easy to disassemble, will allow low-level modifications like firmware, and can run standard software. The next step will be a model that replaces the Intel chip with OpenSPARC, OpenPOWER, or RISC-V multicore with added components for trusted boot or I/O protections. Some are available with some coming online. Next step is using crypto to protect confidentiality & integrity of anything leaving SOC boundary so RAM is untrusted. There will be a lot of money involved for initial development and prototyping of even the first, open chip. So, I understand if they're taking it one step at a time. That's cool as long as they keep the advertising honest about risks they're keeping in for compatibility, etc.
• user5078 10y ago
  I strongly advise anyone to ask one or more security engineers to look at your use-case for anything where the actual security of your system is important. Until then its best to not think of this as any more secure than an off-the shelf system, for your use-case. This would require a thorough analysis of the system as implemented. For example, can my adversary intercept the original delivery and send an alternative that always works no matter what PIN is used? Can the adversary really not learn the PIN you've been sent? Does the adversary have zero day exploits against USB drivers for your platform? Can the adversary shoulder-surf your password and steal both the device and key? Is it really not possible to get info by smashing the box, desoldering the RAM and doing cold boot? And so on - the last one may seem impossible to defend against, but if it matters to the use-case then it must be considered. Edit to add: I expect most cases will have better luck with computer systems that are more ephemeral (buy second hand laptop or raspberry pi in person, destroy often), or more portable (a secured mobile kept in person and used only for the sensitive task).
• startling 10y ago
  Since the monitor is external, I wonder if they've considered monitors as attack surface: https://github.com/RedBalloonShenanigans/MonitorDarkly https://github.com/RedBalloonShenanigans/MonitorDarkly
  • talltower 10y ago
    Correction. The temperature monitor is INSIDE the secure shell.
    • dogma1138 10y ago
      He's talking about display monitors AKA the screens which can be exploited via the i2c bus over the graphical interface (e.g. HDMI). The GP is 100% correct, if you can't trust your keyboard, mouse, and the monitor the "secure computer" concept in this case is problematic, while it does reduce the attack surface somewhat it just focuses the attention of the adversary onto a different vector. If we take their "cleaning man/evil maid" scenario then while implanting the computer might not be possible, implanting the keyboard, mouse or screen would be very possible, and in fact somewhat easier than implanting a regular computer with decent security measures such as an encrypted drive. Add a USB storage device with a micro-controller to the keyboard and you own the computer once it's connected, a monitor today comes with a CPU powerful enough to run custom code which can be used to exfiltrate data as well. Additionally both the keyboard and the monitor could potentially be used to exploit software flaws on the software running on the ORWL unit also. The concept is interesting however this is mostly "security theater" any adversary which would be sophisticated enough to require taking these measures would likely be able to circumvent them, and for the rest these measures don't really do anything; if you use this for day to day operations or on-net activity you'll get pwned via the network; if you keep secrets on this thing worthy of sending some one into your home to implant your PC then they'll implant something else which is connected to it. Oddly enough the only "high tier" adversary that this might thwart would be law enforcement since their computer forensic SOP would pretty much melt down when encountering something which is tamper resistant. But hey, you gotta start somewhere.
      • 10y ago
• BinaryIdiot 10y ago
  Now this is really cool! Though as with all things wireless I'd worry about working and somehow the key fob getting interfered with and boom computer locks up or if a sensor thinks I'm moving the computer when it's really just an Earth quake or maybe even my cat jumping on the table and then the encryption key is deleted. So I love the idea but not sure of the practicality. Those sensors has to essentially work perfectly at all times and I'm not convinced until it's released and reviewed.
  • talltower 10y ago
    The SSD encryption key will only be deleted in case of a tamper event, NOT when the unit is moved. Tamper events are: * freezing the unit * drilling the secure enclosure or other wise breaking the traces on it * prying the enclosure off the PCB So I don't think you have to be too worried about a false trigger of a key erasing.
    • Hello71 10y ago
      what temperature (approximately) is "freezing" (or less likely, overheating)?
      • talltower 10y ago
        We currently have a Spec temperature of triggering a 'freezing event" at just above freezing Temperature 33-35F.
        • Hello71 10y ago
          so if I live in a cold place and take it outside then it might erase my data? or what yellowapple said about losing heating, if I live in a really cold place; if pipes can go below 0 C due to cold temperature, why can I expect that ORWL won't?
    • AgentME 10y ago
      Can a tamper event be triggered through software? It would really simplify the ability to create trap passwords which wipe the device.
• alainv 10y ago
  Any plans to offer a 16GB RAM version? The commentary from Qubes users in the 3.2 release thread [1] seems to indicate 8GB would be borderline for Qubes. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12604417 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12604417
  • deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
  • talltower 10y ago
    The current Intel chipset we selected does only support RAM up to a max of 8GB. We heard the Qubes users loud and clear and the request for 16GB RAM. We will only be able to offer this in a next revision though.
• ausjke 10y ago
  made a product like this before that passed FIPS 140-3, same idea, i.e. a battery-backup-mcu + mainboard.
• Prad 10y ago
  I'd be very interested to see this applied to phones.
• joewee 10y ago
  The proximity based lockdown is interesting but won't prevent the likely scenario of being grabbed while you are using the computer. Silkroad is a famous incident, but I think its the only option in any scenerio where the attacker knows you are using an encrypted disk. I'm curious about your supply chain risk mitigation. Given that the project is open source, can you publish a list of all of your suppliers and the country of production? Great work overall, looks like a nice design.
  • Archi1 10y ago
    Thank you for the feedback! This is still a desktop so if the device is grabbed the power won't stay long. You need NFC to restart and then enter your password. We are still working on opening as much as we can of the design. Bill of Material and drawings will be detailed on www.orwl.org/wiki
    • brbsix 10y ago
      If your device is grabbed by the FBI from the Glen Park library, I don't think they'll be turning it off. Wouldn't they use some sort of device[0] to maintain the power supply? I assume they would also be aware a key fob was in use, at least if you were using reasonably well-known hardware like the ORWL. I noticed the campaign details indicated the power supply voltage is monitored. Will this protect against a hot-plug? [0]: http://www.cru-inc.com/products/wiebetech/hotplug_field_kit_product/ http://www.cru-inc.com/products/wiebetech/hotplug_field_kit_...
      • Fragment 10y ago
        If anyone's wondering, here's the important bit: https://youtu.be/erq4TO_a3z8?t=259 https://youtu.be/erq4TO_a3z8?t=259 I suppose this technique could be modified for most UK pugs too, but I've no idea how you'd manage it for a recessed EU-type socket.
• jpalomaki 10y ago
  In past I've heard about couple of cases where people had some startup idea that involved some clever application/algorithm that would have had to be deployed to customers premises but kept secret. With slight modifications (* ) this sounds like a low cost, but easy to deploy solution to the problem. Some of the security would be lost, but you would still get a reasonably tamper proof computer that is capable of running standard software stack for <$1K. With the same kind of changes you could also build a low cost HSM solution based on this. (* ) Instead of controlling booting, the keyfob could be used to enable/disable console access and the device should be able to recover from short power losses.
• partycoder 10y ago
  "open source and secure", powered by a potentially backdoored Intel processor (i.e: through the Intel Management Engine).
• ingenter 10y ago
  Did you think about manufacturing or designing your own ARM CPUs and releasing HDL for the CPU?
  • talltower 10y ago
    We thought long and hard about the type of platform we want to use for this project. While the x86 platform has many shortcomings, it also provides a big ecosystem of OS and SW, as well as support. The fact that we have two subsystems, secure micro controller being in charge of supplying (and denying) power from the x86 gives us a lot of leverage and protection.