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OK, so what do you want to happen starting tomorrow morning? * All HTTPS sites show up as trusted. Woohoo! * All HTTPS sites show up as untrusted, people are
by geofft 10y ago
OK, so what do you want to happen starting tomorrow morning?
* All HTTPS sites show up as trusted. Woohoo!
* All HTTPS sites show up as untrusted, people are encouraged to switch to HTTP. Woohoo!
* All HTTPS sites use trust-on-first-use, which means that we have a date and time announced when MITM attacks are particularly effective and will persist for a very long time.
* All HTTPS sites are untrusted, except for those that already have certificate pins hard-coded in the browsers' source, and excluding those that are pinning their CAs (because CAs are Broken and Wrong), which means the only websites you can access are Google's properties via Google's browser. Awesome!
* Replace HTTPS with PGP. Only people who know how to use PGP correctly get to use secure web traffic.
- bandrami 10y agoMostly #5, with some of #4. We have known bad certs in the wild (including for Google) so the "security" PKI offers us is just theater. I think the theater should end, which might actually get people off their asses to fix the real problem and stop outsourcing it to shady rent-seeking companies.
- tptacek 10y agoIf the security the CAs offer is "just theater", go spoof DNS and phish Bank of America logins; you should be able to trick users just by rolling self-signed certificates.
- bandrami 10y agoYou do know that BofA is one of the organizations with verified bad certificates in the wild, right? This isn't just a theoretical worry. That's why it's "theater": we know that right now there are valid but bad certificates for a depressing number of entities.
- catwell 10y agoThere was a good start of an answer to that in Perspectives [1] (and later Moxie's Convergence), but sadly those projects are technically dead now. I still think those were good idea, but nothing is ever going to replace CAs without the support of major players such as OS and browser vendors. [1] https://perspectives-project.org/ https://perspectives-project.org/
- tedunangst 10y ago#3, with HKPK and a transition period covered by CAs, is not entirely unreasonable and even offers some real advantages. The changeover doesn't need to take place at the stroke of midnight.
- geofft 10y agoYou could engineer #3 to work, but the big trouble is that occasionally someone will reinstall their web server from scratch (on purpose or as part of disaster recovery), lose the key, and expect not to lose their website permanently. I have yet to see any organization that deals usefully with changed SSH keys and communicates them properly instead of "oh yeah, we changed that, delete it from known_hosts and it'll be fine", and organizations that use SSH are more likely to know what they're doing than the average Internet site (in fact I count MIT's CS department as one of the guilty parties). An internet-wide equivalent of "yeah, just delete example.com from your known_hosts" is essentially an internet-wide announcement of "yeah, plz start MITMing example.com".