7 ms·

>We also hope the public can see that when there are allegations of CA wrongdoing, Mozilla is committed to a fair, transparent and thorough investigation of the

by tux3 10y ago

>We also hope the public can see that when there are allegations of CA wrongdoing, Mozilla is committed to a fair, transparent and thorough investigation of the facts of each case. I'm very happy to see the way Mozilla handled this incident, both with the process and the conclusion. I have a moderate trust in the CA ecosystem as a whole, but I'm glad to see that overwhelming incompetence, if not outright maliciousness, does have consequences even to big CAs. At first though the proposed one year timeout can seem a little short given the impressive list of reported issues, but the conditions given for re-acceptance are strict enough that passing could only indicate a radical change in methodology, at which point it would only make good sense to consider a re-inclusion. In fact if every CA could take a full code security audit and provide complete certificate transparency in the manner proposed, I think we would have reason to feel marginally safer on the Internet.

mtgx 10y ago
My hope would be that since this method of punishing seems to be liked by most and even feels "generous" to some, the browser vendors would more aggressively start handing out "1 year suspensions" for more and more CAs that are caught doing anything even remotely like this. Then after a year or two, and after the CAs have learned that they need to take this stuff seriously, and yet some still get caught doing it, the browser vendors should increase the level of punishment, because those getting caught then wouldn't have much of an excuse anymore.
- tptacek 10y ago
  The people saying this is "generous" are making largely irrational arguments. What Mozilla is proposing is the worst case for incumbent CAs.
  - tajen 10y ago
    > worst case Can you develop please? To me it seems that the worst case would be an immediate and permanent revocation of their certs because of fraud. I find Mozilla/Google very lenient in this affair, and that's probably because I don't understand what's the problem with revoking a CA with short notice. Ok it's annoying for customers, but they just have to subscribe to a new CA and install the new cert. It's annoying but it's a security emergency. If your bank was physically guarded by a security company who has been found to replace agents with puppets in 62 Macau banks, wouldn't the head of security interrupt their week-end to guard the bank and contract a new company? If CA revocation takes customers by surprise today, it's time to start revoking certs more regularly. Heck, if you don't answer to a request from your domain provider within 15 days, your domain can even be revoked. CAs are more important than that.
    - tptacek 10y ago
      Immediate distrust of all StartCom certificates might be the worst case for WoSign/StartCom, but it's not the worst case for the incumbent CAs as a whole, and it's only marginally worse than what's being done already for WoSign/StartCom. The fact that they have a way to punish the CA business itself without punishing its customers is a good thing. It sends a clear message that the browsers can't be blackmailed out of punishing abuse by a CA's huge customer base. The browsers have demonstrated that they can put a CA basically out of business without impacting its customers. If I ran a CA, I'd be much more nervous about this than I would be about them zapping the CA and all its customers.
      - JoshTriplett 10y ago
        > If I ran a CA, I'd be much more nervous about this than I would be about them zapping the CA and all its customers. Exactly. If they insta-revoked the whole CA, it'd hurt a pile of customers (many of which might decide that HTTPS isn't worth the hassle for them). And bigger CAs would say "eh, they can't do that to us, they'd break half the web". Showing that they're willing to say "no new certs from this CA" means they can use that sanction against any arbitrarily large and popular CA.
      - mkj 10y ago
        So wosign's best bet might be to call Mozilla's bluff and issue backdated certs now?
        karlshea 10y ago
        They bring that up in the document: > It is true that this date is chosen by the CA and therefore WoSign/StartCom could back-date certificates to get around this restriction. And there is, as we have explained, evidence that they have done this in the past. However, many eyes are on the Web PKI and if such additional back-dating is discovered (by any means), Mozilla will immediately and permanently revoke trust in all WoSign and StartCom roots.
        10y ago
  - garaetjjte 10y ago
    While it will stop new customers, maybe they can keep extising by issuing them now certificates valid for 2 years.
vtlynch 10y ago
>In fact if every CA could take a full code security audit and provide complete certificate transparency in the manner proposed Given the risks that screwups have to their business, I would think CAs would VOLUNTARILY do this.
- DyslexicAtheist 10y ago
  There are guidelines that have to be followed http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item54279.pdf http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item54279.pdf Nothing illustrates it better than @tux3 above: "I have a moderate trust in the CA ecosystem as a whole" Trust in CA's is a bit like trusting your bank or state. Only that if you trust one bank you automatically trust all banks (unless you use key-pinning or other on top solutions that have been bolted-on afterwards). CAs have a license to print money. What we need is a transparent Authority that is owned by the people not by some megacorp which not only issues sites but individual identity certificates. It's important to know if the CA have "Skin in the game" when they say they can protect you. (none of them do). Disclosure: I work for The Authenticity Institute and we're quite active in that domain (also we think the way CAs are managed is a liability in the age of critical IIoT and ICS security).
- imglorp 10y ago
  Giggle. Look at Diebold's numerous malfeasance issues in ATM and voting industries. If anything, they have much more to lose by voluntary audit. Unsavory CA's might well be in the same position.
  - vtlynch 10y ago
    Can you elaborate? I am not familiar with the specifics of Diebold's problems and how a voluntary audit (which they could choose to keep private and use for internal assessment) would hurt them more than not knowing the risks.

by tux3 10y ago

mtgx 10y ago

My hope would be that since this method of punishing seems to be liked by most and even feels "generous" to some, the browser vendors would more aggressively start handing out "1 year suspensions" for more and more CAs that are caught doing anything even remotely like this. Then after a year or two, and after the CAs have learned that they need to take this stuff seriously, and yet some still get caught doing it, the browser vendors should increase the level of punishment, because those getting caught then wouldn't have much of an excuse anymore.

tptacek 10y ago
The people saying this is "generous" are making largely irrational arguments. What Mozilla is proposing is the worst case for incumbent CAs.
- tajen 10y ago
  > worst case Can you develop please? To me it seems that the worst case would be an immediate and permanent revocation of their certs because of fraud. I find Mozilla/Google very lenient in this affair, and that's probably because I don't understand what's the problem with revoking a CA with short notice. Ok it's annoying for customers, but they just have to subscribe to a new CA and install the new cert. It's annoying but it's a security emergency. If your bank was physically guarded by a security company who has been found to replace agents with puppets in 62 Macau banks, wouldn't the head of security interrupt their week-end to guard the bank and contract a new company? If CA revocation takes customers by surprise today, it's time to start revoking certs more regularly. Heck, if you don't answer to a request from your domain provider within 15 days, your domain can even be revoked. CAs are more important than that.
  - tptacek 10y ago
    Immediate distrust of all StartCom certificates might be the worst case for WoSign/StartCom, but it's not the worst case for the incumbent CAs as a whole, and it's only marginally worse than what's being done already for WoSign/StartCom. The fact that they have a way to punish the CA business itself without punishing its customers is a good thing. It sends a clear message that the browsers can't be blackmailed out of punishing abuse by a CA's huge customer base. The browsers have demonstrated that they can put a CA basically out of business without impacting its customers. If I ran a CA, I'd be much more nervous about this than I would be about them zapping the CA and all its customers.
    - JoshTriplett 10y ago
      > If I ran a CA, I'd be much more nervous about this than I would be about them zapping the CA and all its customers. Exactly. If they insta-revoked the whole CA, it'd hurt a pile of customers (many of which might decide that HTTPS isn't worth the hassle for them). And bigger CAs would say "eh, they can't do that to us, they'd break half the web". Showing that they're willing to say "no new certs from this CA" means they can use that sanction against any arbitrarily large and popular CA.
    - mkj 10y ago
      So wosign's best bet might be to call Mozilla's bluff and issue backdated certs now?
      - karlshea 10y ago
        They bring that up in the document: > It is true that this date is chosen by the CA and therefore WoSign/StartCom could back-date certificates to get around this restriction. And there is, as we have explained, evidence that they have done this in the past. However, many eyes are on the Web PKI and if such additional back-dating is discovered (by any means), Mozilla will immediately and permanently revoke trust in all WoSign and StartCom roots.
        10y ago
- garaetjjte 10y ago
  While it will stop new customers, maybe they can keep extising by issuing them now certificates valid for 2 years.

vtlynch 10y ago

>In fact if every CA could take a full code security audit and provide complete certificate transparency in the manner proposed Given the risks that screwups have to their business, I would think CAs would VOLUNTARILY do this.

DyslexicAtheist 10y ago
There are guidelines that have to be followed http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item54279.pdf http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item54279.pdf Nothing illustrates it better than @tux3 above: "I have a moderate trust in the CA ecosystem as a whole" Trust in CA's is a bit like trusting your bank or state. Only that if you trust one bank you automatically trust all banks (unless you use key-pinning or other on top solutions that have been bolted-on afterwards). CAs have a license to print money. What we need is a transparent Authority that is owned by the people not by some megacorp which not only issues sites but individual identity certificates. It's important to know if the CA have "Skin in the game" when they say they can protect you. (none of them do). Disclosure: I work for The Authenticity Institute and we're quite active in that domain (also we think the way CAs are managed is a liability in the age of critical IIoT and ICS security).
imglorp 10y ago
Giggle. Look at Diebold's numerous malfeasance issues in ATM and voting industries. If anything, they have much more to lose by voluntary audit. Unsavory CA's might well be in the same position.
- vtlynch 10y ago
  Can you elaborate? I am not familiar with the specifics of Diebold's problems and how a voluntary audit (which they could choose to keep private and use for internal assessment) would hurt them more than not knowing the risks.