3 ms·
"It might not be mature enough yet for widespread adoption, and it doesn't revolutionize all parts of a cryprosystem, but it is definitely progress in the narro
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
"It might not be mature enough yet for widespread adoption, and it doesn't revolutionize all parts of a cryprosystem, but it is definitely progress in the narrower problems of key distribution and perfect forward secrecy for one-time pads"
I'm not sure. The best minds I've talked to in high-assurance security don't believe it. One, Clive Robinson on Schneier's blog, predicted we'd see classical attacks on it. Something like that happened. I pointed out there would still be software, endpoints, interception, subversion, etc for bypass whereas the tech itself was little understood versus effects of regular electronics. Tried and true beats novel and new if it's high-security I always say.
No, these devices are not trustworthy or even necessary that I can tell. High-assurance key exchange is a solved problem if the organization is the simpler, hierarchical designs likely to use QKD. Many solutions available with the most reliable being a courier and key-handling hardware you can trust that only has part of the secret + another transmitted over various medium with it all using several layers of symmetric to work (eg my polymorphic schemes). All on dedicated, low-TCB devices.
I don't know what QKD costs today but I bet it's still cheaper to courier the pre-shared keys and use tamper-resistant hardware. Do you have numbers on it in terms of amount of keys negotiated over time and at what cost for hardware w/ HA setup?