3 ms·
> Tor is not, nor has it ever been, trustworthy. Hell, you can still try active deanonymization for youself: https://github.com/Miserlou/Detour https://github.c
by openasocket 10y ago
> Tor is not, nor has it ever been, trustworthy. Hell, you can still try active deanonymization for youself: https://github.com/Miserlou/Detour https://github.com/Miserlou/Detour
Is it even possible to protect against end-to-end time correlation attacks without massively increasing latency?
- Mizza 10y agoI'd call that an "open problem."
- openasocket 10y agoI'm fairly certain it isn't possible. If you can detect, with high confidence, that an entity received a message and that an entity sent a message, timing attacks can be done. The traditional means to prevent this involves sending dummy traffic, introducing unpredictable latency, or using some sort of broadcast to conceal the exact receiver. None of those things are practical for a low-latency proxy. It's been a couple years since I studied this, so I might be wrong.