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I wouldn't say that's really a problem, because there's a perfectly fine scientific explanation of why it doesn't (couldn't) "capture" this. The experience of c

I wouldn't say that's really a problem, because there's a perfectly fine scientific explanation of why it doesn't (couldn't) "capture" this. The experience of color or taste is triggered when information is fed to the brain through specific pathways. The pathways that are activated when we read about something are different and don't reach the same places, so any information you acquire through reading and cognition is necessarily going to be "tasteless". Because of that, we can't possibly "connect" our knowledge of the process that causes the qualia of taste to the qualia of taste, but that's just a limitation of the brain's wiring, not a fault in the model itself.

RivieraKid 10y ago
> the experience of color or taste is triggered when information is fed to the brain through specific pathways The question is why the experience is triggered. Why does moving atoms at specific positions trigger the perception of color or pain? Current physics doesn't have an answer for that, even in theory, assuming we can see exactly what happens in the brain.
- breuleux 10y ago
  The thing is, though, that even if "physics" did have an answer to this, it's not a given that we would understand it. Our incapability to wrap our head around reductionist explanations of qualia does not entail that they are inaccurate, only that they fail to satisfy us. I mean, let me put it this way: what do you expect from an answer? For example, in order to understand why atoms moving in certain ways produce a taste, do you need the explanation to trigger some experience or memory of a taste? If so, you will never understand. Or do you expect the answer to be short? What if qualia tend to be as complex as the brains that experience them (for holistic reasons), so the proof for our own qualia spans trillions of pages? I think that's actually quite probable, but you'll never understand in that case either. The space of naturalistic explanations of things is humongous and we're already mass producing objects so complex no single individual could hope to understand every aspect of them. If you're going to start with "moving atoms at specific positions" in order to understand a defining aspect of a system made out of hundreds of billions of complex switches connected in obscure ways, let me tell you that you're going to need several Libraries of Congress before you're done.
  - myflash13 10y ago
    What I expect from an answer to the hard problem of consciousness is a basic high level explanation for how the moving of atoms in certain ways can actually give rise to qualia. You seem to be starting with the presumption that it does. But I'm not convinced that the moving of atoms alone can possibly give rise to qualia, because our knowledge so far about how atoms move seems completely different from our experience of qualia. On the other hand, I don't understand all the details of what goes into a Macbook Pro, from network protocols to graphics rendering, but I have a basic high level understanding of how the things it does are possible, and it doesn't take a Library of Congress to explain that. My high level knowledge of how atoms move provide sufficient assurance and understanding of how a Macbook Pro experience is created. That is simply not true for qualia.
    - breuleux 10y ago
      > My high level knowledge of how atoms move provide sufficient assurance and understanding of how a Macbook Pro experience is created. I don't think it does per se. In a world where computers didn't exist you would probably not be able to say whether a MacBook Pro is a thing that could possibly exist or not just from fundamental knowledge of physics. If I gave you the most low-level possible description of physics, it'd probably take you some time to figure out whether it supports solid macroscopic objects. If I just give you the rules to the Game of Life cellular automaton, it's far from obvious that it supports replicators, let alone that it's Turing complete. Most of these things are only obvious in hindsight, and the understanding is made easier by the lack of cognitive dissonance: we know we made them using certain principles, so of course it works. > That is simply not true for qualia. I don't know about that. My own high level knowledge of physics does provide me with sufficient assurance and understanding of how qualia happens. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I do feel like I understand it: what defines or distinguishes, say, my qualia of red, is how it primes my brain into thinking about red things, how it changes my mood, how it behaves relative to every other concept, which makes it about as complex as my entire brain would be. I also imagine that there is a continuum of "qualia" such that basically any physical system has some, but they are so trivial we don't make the connection. Again, that could be nonsense, but it makes perfect sense to me -- about as much as a MacBook does. The hard problem that you see flat out does not exist to me, and presumably the reason is that we are satisfied by different explanations.
- FeepingCreature 10y ago
  Nonetheless, there is no reason to expect a description to be able to trigger the experience even if we knew exactly why it was triggered by sensory input.

RivieraKid 10y ago

> the experience of color or taste is triggered when information is fed to the brain through specific pathways The question is why the experience is triggered. Why does moving atoms at specific positions trigger the perception of color or pain? Current physics doesn't have an answer for that, even in theory, assuming we can see exactly what happens in the brain.

breuleux 10y ago
The thing is, though, that even if "physics" did have an answer to this, it's not a given that we would understand it. Our incapability to wrap our head around reductionist explanations of qualia does not entail that they are inaccurate, only that they fail to satisfy us. I mean, let me put it this way: what do you expect from an answer? For example, in order to understand why atoms moving in certain ways produce a taste, do you need the explanation to trigger some experience or memory of a taste? If so, you will never understand. Or do you expect the answer to be short? What if qualia tend to be as complex as the brains that experience them (for holistic reasons), so the proof for our own qualia spans trillions of pages? I think that's actually quite probable, but you'll never understand in that case either. The space of naturalistic explanations of things is humongous and we're already mass producing objects so complex no single individual could hope to understand every aspect of them. If you're going to start with "moving atoms at specific positions" in order to understand a defining aspect of a system made out of hundreds of billions of complex switches connected in obscure ways, let me tell you that you're going to need several Libraries of Congress before you're done.
- myflash13 10y ago
  What I expect from an answer to the hard problem of consciousness is a basic high level explanation for how the moving of atoms in certain ways can actually give rise to qualia. You seem to be starting with the presumption that it does. But I'm not convinced that the moving of atoms alone can possibly give rise to qualia, because our knowledge so far about how atoms move seems completely different from our experience of qualia. On the other hand, I don't understand all the details of what goes into a Macbook Pro, from network protocols to graphics rendering, but I have a basic high level understanding of how the things it does are possible, and it doesn't take a Library of Congress to explain that. My high level knowledge of how atoms move provide sufficient assurance and understanding of how a Macbook Pro experience is created. That is simply not true for qualia.
  - breuleux 10y ago
    > My high level knowledge of how atoms move provide sufficient assurance and understanding of how a Macbook Pro experience is created. I don't think it does per se. In a world where computers didn't exist you would probably not be able to say whether a MacBook Pro is a thing that could possibly exist or not just from fundamental knowledge of physics. If I gave you the most low-level possible description of physics, it'd probably take you some time to figure out whether it supports solid macroscopic objects. If I just give you the rules to the Game of Life cellular automaton, it's far from obvious that it supports replicators, let alone that it's Turing complete. Most of these things are only obvious in hindsight, and the understanding is made easier by the lack of cognitive dissonance: we know we made them using certain principles, so of course it works. > That is simply not true for qualia. I don't know about that. My own high level knowledge of physics does provide me with sufficient assurance and understanding of how qualia happens. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I do feel like I understand it: what defines or distinguishes, say, my qualia of red, is how it primes my brain into thinking about red things, how it changes my mood, how it behaves relative to every other concept, which makes it about as complex as my entire brain would be. I also imagine that there is a continuum of "qualia" such that basically any physical system has some, but they are so trivial we don't make the connection. Again, that could be nonsense, but it makes perfect sense to me -- about as much as a MacBook does. The hard problem that you see flat out does not exist to me, and presumably the reason is that we are satisfied by different explanations.
FeepingCreature 10y ago
Nonetheless, there is no reason to expect a description to be able to trigger the experience even if we knew exactly why it was triggered by sensory input.