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Yes. To fix this generally, we'd have to stop hashing passwords for storage so we could use a ZK proof to verify. There is a hacky middleground whereby a ssh c
by mindslight 10y ago
Yes. To fix this generally, we'd have to stop hashing passwords for storage so we could use a ZK proof to verify.
There is a hacky middleground whereby a ssh client could hash what you think is your password with the server's identity to derive your actual password. But there's the issue of coming up with a canonical identity for a server, and if we merely trust the server to provide it then the scheme fails to a malicious one. Nevermind it would require special setup on the server, and the utility of password auth is for before you've setup public key auth.
- wiml 10y agoYou can hash the password in a way that allows the server to verify but without providing the server or an interceptor with the ability to impersonate. SRP/PAKE and SCRAM are examples.
- mindslight 10y agoDoh. It felt like there should be a more complex method replacing the hash with an asymmetric op, but I knew it would be hard to casually describe. In retrospect, obviously the "zero knowledge" bit must imply the server does not know the password! But yeah, general point remains that currently, crypt(3) is a black box to login methods. To make any login method not have to handle the actual password, it needs to be some well-defined function that is compatible with such math.
- nroets 10y agoI'm not sure what you mean by ZK proof. But the best password based authentication scheme will only allow an impostor one guess at the password. For example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaires https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaires
- wfunction 10y agoI think it stands for "zero knowledge" proof?
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