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A really worthwhile article. Infrastructure spending can be helpful, but the particulars of the project matter a great deal. >A well-known 1988 Congressional B

A really worthwhile article. Infrastructure spending can be helpful, but the particulars of the project matter a great deal. >A well-known 1988 Congressional Budget Office survey found that spending to maintain current highways in good shape produces returns of 30 percent to 40 percent—but that new highway construction in rural areas showed a much lower return. But also: > California’s huge investment in high-speed rail was justified by a 2014 cost-benefit analysis that Parsons Brinckerhoff, the firm building the rail system, had prepared. The report predicted that total benefits from the project would range from $66 billion to $80 billion over several decades. That number looked reasonable when the projected price tag for the project was $35 billion, but the budget has already swollen to $68 billion—and is still expanding.

dragonwriter 10y ago
> California’s huge investment in high-speed rail was justified by a 2014 cost-benefit analysis that Parsons Brinckerhoff, the firm building the rail system, had prepared. The report predicted that total benefits from the project would range from $66 billion to $80 billion over several decades. That number looked reasonable when the projected price tag for the project was $35 billion, but the budget has already swollen to $68 billion—and is still expanding. Wow, the pile of errors there is pretty amazing... (1) The SF-Anaheim route (Phase 1) was estimated at $33 billion in current dollars in 2006 (given the construction and inflation estimates in that plan, that was $65 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars at that time), but that was quickly revised to $96 billion year-of-expenditure if exclusive trackage (the original plan) was retained for the whole route. By the 2012 business plan, that option (no longer the preferred one) was down to $91.3 billion year-of-expenditure, and the now-preferred blended system which used some shared track was $68.3 year-of-expenditure. (2) The supposed 2014 report from Parsons Brinckerhoff (which hadn't yet been selected as the lead partner for the rail delivery contract) doesn't seem to exist; all the High Speed Rail Authority's commissioned studies and reports are published on the Authority web page together by year, and there is no 2014 report from Parsons Brinckerhoff, and no report (in 2014 or otherwise, from Parsons Brinckerhoff or otherwise) I can find making the prediction indicated in the quote, after skimming the ones that seemed from their titles to focus on economic impacts. There is a 2016 fact sheet claiming that the Phase I alignment is an alternative to a combination of freeway and airport construction that would cost $158 billion to provide equivalent capacity, which at a $68 billion price tag for High-Speed Rail would be $80 billion of net savings in construction cost alone (there are also operations/maintenance cost savings) -- not total benefit before cost.
- HillaryBriss 10y ago
  I think the article may have been referring to page 30 of this 2014 Parsons Brinckerhoff document on HSR's site: http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/BPlan_2014_Sec_7_CaHSR_Benefit_Cost_Analysis.pdf http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/BPlan_2014_S... where it says: Total Benefits $80,541,866,770 and Grand Total Discounted Costs $34,639,084,822

dragonwriter 10y ago

> California’s huge investment in high-speed rail was justified by a 2014 cost-benefit analysis that Parsons Brinckerhoff, the firm building the rail system, had prepared. The report predicted that total benefits from the project would range from $66 billion to $80 billion over several decades. That number looked reasonable when the projected price tag for the project was $35 billion, but the budget has already swollen to $68 billion—and is still expanding. Wow, the pile of errors there is pretty amazing... (1) The SF-Anaheim route (Phase 1) was estimated at $33 billion in current dollars in 2006 (given the construction and inflation estimates in that plan, that was $65 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars at that time), but that was quickly revised to $96 billion year-of-expenditure if exclusive trackage (the original plan) was retained for the whole route. By the 2012 business plan, that option (no longer the preferred one) was down to $91.3 billion year-of-expenditure, and the now-preferred blended system which used some shared track was $68.3 year-of-expenditure. (2) The supposed 2014 report from Parsons Brinckerhoff (which hadn't yet been selected as the lead partner for the rail delivery contract) doesn't seem to exist; all the High Speed Rail Authority's commissioned studies and reports are published on the Authority web page together by year, and there is no 2014 report from Parsons Brinckerhoff, and no report (in 2014 or otherwise, from Parsons Brinckerhoff or otherwise) I can find making the prediction indicated in the quote, after skimming the ones that seemed from their titles to focus on economic impacts. There is a 2016 fact sheet claiming that the Phase I alignment is an alternative to a combination of freeway and airport construction that would cost $158 billion to provide equivalent capacity, which at a $68 billion price tag for High-Speed Rail would be $80 billion of net savings in construction cost alone (there are also operations/maintenance cost savings) -- not total benefit before cost.

HillaryBriss 10y ago
I think the article may have been referring to page 30 of this 2014 Parsons Brinckerhoff document on HSR's site: http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/BPlan_2014_Sec_7_CaHSR_Benefit_Cost_Analysis.pdf http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/BPlan_2014_S... where it says: Total Benefits $80,541,866,770 and Grand Total Discounted Costs $34,639,084,822