It is not true that the ruling says that "this only applies to those who willingly and intentionally link to content they _know_ is illegal, _and_ do so for mon

It is not true that the ruling says that "this only applies to those who willingly and intentionally link to content they _know_ is illegal, _and_ do so for monetary gain." The ruling explicitly states that the first condition is sufficient to constitute a 'communication to the public' and that, when determining whether posting a link to such content constitutes a 'communication to the public', we must assume that the second condition implies the first condition. This last bit is in the ruling itself. In its consideration of the questions referred, the court qualifies a similar statement with "in so far as that rebuttable presumption is not rebutted", which may at least help those who can disprove that presumption. Two relevant portions of the court's judgment (my emphasis added to the latter): > In contrast, where it is established that such a person knew or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted provides access to a work illegally placed on the internet, for example owing to the fact that he was notified thereof by the copyright holders, it is necessary to consider that the provision of that link constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. > or whether, on the contrary, those links are provided for such a purpose, _a situation in which that knowledge must be presumed_.