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the industry has previously responded by installing their own root certificates into the trust-store of the OS. Mobile operator supplied versions of android are
by DyslexicAtheist 10y ago
the industry has previously responded by installing their own root certificates into the trust-store of the OS. Mobile operator supplied versions of android are a good example, ... on notebooks we got Lenovo, ... http://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/superfish-is-not-the-only-one.373647/ http://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/superfish-is-not-the-...
Trusting certificates issued by CAs, companies that have no 'skin in the game' (WoSign), or are too big to fail (Symantec, Comodo, ...) won't work for what we actually want to do (securing the transport layer of critical infrastructure, all the way to sharing economy, and even online-banking).
More HSTS/HPKP?
Certificate pinning (HPKP) is a great example of "security as an after-thought". Not that it's bad (HPKP is great if you know what you're doing) but it's unpractical and can seriously brick your site. There are also several other attack vectors against HPKP: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12434585 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12434585
The solution isn't to bolt on more X509 on top of a broken foundation. It is on the other hand so typical of how we fix issues in engineering.