2 ms·
This technology is simple, relatively easy to work with, and only secure against the simplest attacks. The two major problems are that it lacks any sort of aut
by amluto 10y ago
This technology is simple, relatively easy to work with, and only secure against the simplest attacks. The two major problems are that it lacks any sort of authentication and that it doesn't even attempt to protect CPU state. I'll quote myself [1]:
Someone will break it by replaying old data through the VM, either to
confuse control flow or to use some part of the VM code as an oracle
with which to attack another part.
Someone else will break it by installing a #UD / #PF handler and using
the resulting exceptions as an oracle.
A third clever person will break it by carefully constructing a
scenario in which randomizing 16 bytes of data has a high probability
of letting then pwn your system. (For example, what if the secured VM
creates an RSA key and you can carefully interrupt it right aftergenerating p and q. Replace 16 bytes from the middle of both p and q (32 bytes total) with random garbage. With reasonably high probability, the resulting p and q will no longer be prime.)
Depending on how strong [AMD's] ASID protection is, a fourth clever person will break it by replacing a bunch of the VM out from under the target while leaving the sensitive data in place and then will use some existing exploit or design issue to gain code execution in the modified VM.
Also, I really hope that [AMD's] tweakable cipher mode is at least CCA2 secure, because attackers can absolutely hit it with adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. (Actually, attackers can alternate between adaptive chosen ciphertext and adaptive chosen plaintext.)
And did the SEV implementation remember to encrypt the guest register state? Because, if not, everything of importance will leak out through the VMCB and/or GPRs.
But I guess it's better than nothing.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWAP5hxQeVSwNx-XkO53-X3bX0LasjOuHxeRWCTob7JAA@mail.gmail.com https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWAP5hxQeVSwNx-XkO53-X3bX0La...