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Nice tech, but not sure how quickly it will be adopted, Intel's SGX doesn't seem to have very high adoption (or at all) even tho it does similar things as it en
by dogma1138 10y ago
Nice tech, but not sure how quickly it will be adopted, Intel's SGX doesn't seem to have very high adoption (or at all) even tho it does similar things as it enables application/guest isolation and memory encryption and seems to be at least on paper even more robust (Intel claims complete security even when the OS/VMM/Driver and BIOS/Firmware are compromised).
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002.pdf https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002.pd...
But given all the side channel attacks against VMMs these days it's pretty important that both major CPU vendors have hardware level countermeasures against these attacks.
- mtgx 10y agoUnfortunately, as usual, what Intel says and what actually happens are two quite different things: > Shortly after we learned about Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) initiative, we set out to study it in the hope of finding a practical solution to its vulnerability to cache timing attacks. After reading the official SGX manuals, we were left with more questions than when we started. The SGX patents filled some of the gaps in the official documentation, but also revealed Intel’s enclave licensing scheme, which has troubling implications. > After learning about the SGX implementation and inferring its design constraints, we discarded our draft proposals for defending enclave software against cache timing attacks. We concluded that it would be impossible to claim to provide this kind of guarantee given the design constraints and all the unknowns surrounding the SGX implementation. Instead, we applied the knowledge that we gained to design Sanctum [38], which is briefly described in § 4.9. > This paper describes our findings while studying SGX. We hope that it will help fellow researchers understand the breadth of issues that need to be considered before accepting a trusted hardware design as secure. We also hope that our work will prompt the research community to expect more openness from the vendors who ask us to trust their hardware. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/086.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/086.pdf
- dogma1138 10y agoThat's not that unusual for Intel or anyone else, while SGX doesn't protect against all types of attacks it does protect against some, I'm not seeing anything in SEV that can explicitly protect against cache timing attacks, and there is potential for the keys to leak through various side channel attacks in almost every implementation including SGX/SEV. Overall if you go through their paper page 38 has a good overview of various hardware security platforms / frameworks and what attacks they can protect against and what they are still vulnerable too. SGX seems to be vulnerable to 2 cache timing attacks and a page fault attack, it however does provide mitigation / protection against malicious hypervisor / OS attacks, as well as co residing malicious applications, and if you use SGX + TXT (& TPM) in theory you are only exposed to container level cache timing attacks which while might not be great is still something. Don't let perfect be the enemy of good :)
- ngneer 10y agoI do not know about "Unfortunately" and "as usual", but surely Intel cannot be held liable for researchers getting their hopes up about a system they have yet to examine. Defending against a software side-channel adversary was never a design objective of SGX, and Intel acknowledges so on slide 115 of the tutorial linked below. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002.pdf https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/332680-002.pd...
- anonymousDan 10y agoI think it's a bit harsh to criticize SGX for not having very high adoption. It has only become available to the public this year, and it is a pretty new technology so it will take time for existing software stacks to adapt to it. There is a lot of interest in it in academia fwiw.