> Inside the world, the universe is contained in 1 GB (say, a smaller version of the universe, simplified physics, etc). > They simulation agents don't perceiv

> Inside the world, the universe is contained in 1 GB (say, a smaller version of the universe, simplified physics, etc). > They simulation agents don't perceive a short-coming because they have never been exposed to the out-the-simulation experiences. I agree, and this was the only part I found lacking in the article. For example, where it says: > The argument is quite simple: we already make simulations, and with better technology it should be possible to create the ultimate one, with conscious agents that experience it as totally lifelike. This is implying that the world we experience is somehow the "ultimate" one, and it would require super-intelligence to bring a mere simulation up to this pinnacle of existence. In fact, that's also an implicit assumption being made by those searching for 'errors' (not to dismiss such efforts; chasing empirical evidence is the best contribution to make in such arguments). Yet if our universe is a simulation, there's nothing to say it's not actually a crappy, low-res, toy-physics sandbox; the simulators may consider it to be as "ultimate" and "lifelike" as we find 80s home computer games.