Yes, sandboxing and ephemeral machines are far and away the best defense a CI system has against compiling/testing malicious code. But the vast majority of CI s

Yes, sandboxing and ephemeral machines are far and away the best defense a CI system has against compiling/testing malicious code. But the vast majority of CI systems don't actually use ephemeral executors because imaging between runs is slow and rebuilding your whole checkout/object cache is expensive. You don't need to own the CI server in order to own a project. You can take over all of the individual executors and replace their linker with your own version that links against an attacker-supplied backdoored fork of openssl (for an extreme and topical example). Doesn't even require constantly-running code which might be detected by a monitoring system, and naturally persists across reboots (but not reimagings). I'm glad that GitLab is paying attention to these things. The Travis which is tightly integrated with GitHub also seems to do a good job, although I haven't looked into it extensively. But plenty of orgs run self-hosted CI that simply isn't up to proper security standards in this respect.