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And how do you get a TLS certificate? By… proving that you control the DNS. Come back when there’s a working attack against the crypto of DNSSEC; being “outmo
by teddyh 10y ago
And how do you get a TLS certificate? By… proving that you control the DNS. Come back when there’s a working attack against the crypto of DNSSEC; being “outmoded” is not a security flaw. DNS is, on a very fundamental level cached, by slave servers, who does not, and should not, need to have access to the DNSSEC key to do live signing of records. DNSSEC was made for security, and explicitly not encryption – bringing up its lack of encryption like it’s a fundamental flaw in DNSSEC is a strawman argument. Regarding enumerating zones, you do know of the NSEC3 record (widely deployed for years) and the work on NSEC5, right? They were made to fix that, and, as I understand, were successful. Arguing against DNSSEC because we could in theory have something better reminds me of those arguing against SSL because the CA model is flawed. Sure it’s not perfect (what ever is?) but it’s what we have, and it’s better that the practical nothing we would have if we keep arguing about theoretical perfection over actual deployment of working code.
- tptacek 10y agoYou are like the 9th person on this thread to make the same banal point about the relationship between DV certificates and the DNS. It's not accurate. See: rest of thread. I don't so much mind people making the same arguments over and over again on different threads, but when you can read the thread and see the clever point you're about to make has already been litigated, I'm less sanguine.
- rocqua 10y agoYou keep offering HPKP as a solution in a thread regarding an article that shows how HPKP sucks. Hence why we keep repeating the same point.
- tptacek 10y agoThe article doesn't show that HPKP "sucks". The article shows that HPKP can be dangerous. PKP isn't going anywhere, and we've been relying on it for years: it is likely that at least one CA has been penalized for breaking PKP pins. This is very much unlike DNSSEC. True statement: we could publish the secret keys for the root ZSK on Pastebin today, and nothing on the Internet would break, because nobody relies on DNSSEC for their security.