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Sure, Google is defended, as are some other big sites. However, this isn't a scalable solution. Are you really going to argue that the sites small enough not to
by rocqua 10y ago
Sure, Google is defended, as are some other big sites. However, this isn't a scalable solution. Are you really going to argue that the sites small enough not to be statically pinned don't deserve to be safe from state-level attacks?
- tptacek 10y agoNo? That's what HPKP does: it allows sites of any size to pin certificates.
- rocqua 10y agoI'd say the article shows plenty of issues with HKPK. It also forgoes the fact that HKPK only works on the second visit.
- tptacek 10y agoFor that one user. But part of the point of HPKP is that it raises the stakes for CAs who would issue bogus certificates: someone will have their pin broken, browsers will notice, CAs will be forced into CT or worse.
- rocqua 10y agoI have kinda lost faith in the stakes for CAs. It seems like they have to fuck over a really big client for anything to happen. In general, the CA system is fucked and we need a new one. Note that I never said DANE should be the replacement for CAs. Instead I wanted DANE pinnen to replace HPKP. I wonder if any if this is even relevant when you consider downgrade attacks.
- tptacek 10y agoEveryone has lost faith in the CA system. The problem is that DANE doubles down on it by creating a new hierarchical PKI, this time de jure controlled by governments. And it's not even a good PKI! It's a PKI built around 1990s cryptography. DANE is not the answer. Mandatory CT and enforcement of CA Baseline Requirements by browsers is the immediate step. A decentralized trust model is the step after that. None of these steps require the USG to escrow our keys.
- rocqua 10y agoDANE doesn't quite double down, it reduces the attack surface to your TLD, instead of all CAs. It sucks as a replacement to CAs. However, when it comes to pinning, it is an alternative to HPKP that avoids the costs mentioned at the article, giving up power to the TLD as the price. In any case, I wouldn't mind if the USG was one of the parties that get to vouch for my key. Many attackers don't have control over the USG. Obviously, that requires multiple other parties that also vouch for my key. I'm also quite interested in what you think the decentralized trust model looks like. Specifically, the out-of-the-box experience.