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> DANE is effectively a key escrow system. COM's keys would > be held by the USG. That is one mode of DANE. There is also a pinning mode of DANE, where you re
by rocqua 10y ago
> DANE is effectively a key escrow system. COM's keys would
> be held by the USG.
That is one mode of DANE. There is also a pinning mode of DANE, where you restrict what certificates can be used to sign yours. This is then an add-on to the CA system, so you'd still need to convince a CA to give you a certificate to MITM.
Besides, as others have said. Those same DNS servers can already break the current systems as they can simply rebind and get a certificate through any CA.
> The "last mile" on DANE is spoofable
The last mile is only spoofable if you don't locally run a DNSSEC validating resolver. This is easy enough to set up.
> DNSSEC is far, far more expensive to deploy than HPKP (HPKP is just a header you add to your web server configuration).
Does that hold when you take into account the safeguards required to sanely setup HPKP? I'd say the article explains quite well the issues with deploying HPKP.
Sure, DANE and DNSSEC aren't going to replace the CA system. They can certainly complement it though.