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If you don’t trust the DNS, you’re pretty much screwed anyhow. The solution to the “last mile” problem is to run a private resolver on each machine. The DNSSE
by teddyh 10y ago
If you don’t trust the DNS, you’re pretty much screwed anyhow. The solution to the “last mile” problem is to run a private resolver on each machine. The DNSSEC root KSK (master) key is 2048 bits, and the ZSK is due to change to 2048 bits this year, after careful consideration of all the factors.
- tptacek 10y agoFirst: no, not only is it not true that we must trust the DNS, but not having to trust the DNS is literally part of the thesis statement of SSL/TLS. Second: you only need to break the weakest of the keys to attack the system. It's 2016, and we're talking about deploying a system that aspires to RSA-2048 or ECDSA, both of which are outmoded. It actually gets worse. DNSSEC was designed in the mid-1990s with the assumption that cryptography was too expensive to deploy at scale. It's for this reason that DNSSEC uses signing-only constructions and requires support for offline signers: that is, support for people who will sign once, offline, and then never touch cryptography again. All sorts of badness flows from support for offline signers. In particular: DNSSEC responses themselves are not encrypted. Despite relying on the most expensive cryptography primitive (public key signatures), the protocol offers no privacy at all. This would be funny if it weren't for the fact that it turns out you need online signers anyways. Without online signers, there's no way to simultaneously (a) authenticate negative responses (ie: prevent someone from spoofing an NXDOMAIN response) and (b) not reveal all the names in a DNS zone. Surprisingly (at least to the people on the working group), pretty much everyone demands (b), and so pretty much every real-world DNSSEC deployment is an online-signer, so that it can synthesize NSEC records to trick out people trying to dump zones. It's an incoherent protocol that deliberately handicaps itself in an attempt to achieve a design objective that turns out not to be possible to achieve. Moreover: the more DNSSEC gets deployed today, the harder it will get to deploy fast, modern, misuse-resistant curve signature schemes. That's because anything you try to deploy on DNSSSEC needs to be supported by pretty much all the DNSSEC resolvers, because DNS is an infrastructure protocol, not an application-layer protocol. It's for the same reason that DNSSEC failures cause sites to vanish completely from the Internet rather than generating pop-up warnings.
- garaetjjte 10y ago> First: no, not only is it not true that we must trust the DNS, but not having to trust the DNS is literally part of the thesis statement of SSL/TLS. Uh. Certificates are issued by checking DNS entries, and you are saying that we don't have to trust it.
- tptacek 10y agoThat is correct, yes.
- snowwrestler 10y agoYour usual example here is how hard it is to get a domain-auth cert for google.com, but what about a small e-commerce site? What should they do to prevent a bad guy from getting a domain-auth cert by spoofing DNS? Honestly asking for my education (and others).
- tptacek 10y agoThey should get an OV cert and use HPKP for their domain. That is: if they're worried that a state-level attacker is going to MITM their users with a fake certificate.
- rocqua 10y agoOV certs do almost nothing to prevent MITM attacks. Unless you expect users to recognize when an OV cert is replaced with a DV one. Moreover, HPKP means that I have to trust my first visit to a site. Any new site could be MITMed. Heck, HPKP means that anyone that gets to MITM your domain can wreck it for however long a Pin is valid.
- tptacek 10y agoIt's easy to "win" arguments if you cherry pick parts of them and ignore the rest.