It's not in any way a call to weaken Tor, but I think that response is indicative of an ideological viewpoint that will achieve the same result. A perfectly se

It's not in any way a call to weaken Tor, but I think that response is indicative of an ideological viewpoint that will achieve the same result. A perfectly secure, perfectly anonymous network that no network-neutral party will service because of the levels of abuse which come from it is no stronger a solution than an insecure, de-anonymized solution. The parent blog post implicitly acknowledges this -- the poster disables exit handling for SMTP and BGP traffic because of that traffic's likelihood for abuse and the resulting effect on the exit node, even though such traffic might have legitimate uses. Practical requirements of node functionality trump ideology, in the case of SMTP and BGP traffic at least. While Tor operators may accept abusive traffic as a result of their greater goal, the upstream providers of their nodes may not. The ability to reliably deliver traffic for all customers, Tor and non-Tor is key to their business. If that ability becomes compromised, they take action to preserve their business.