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>Should we be socialists or capitalists? Is one system better than the other? What does it mean for an economic system to be "better" than another anyway? On th

>Should we be socialists or capitalists? Is one system better than the other? What does it mean for an economic system to be "better" than another anyway? On the basis of philosophical arguments regarding these questions, people have been inspired to violently murder those who they see as perpetuating injustice. Surely, then, these arguments are not just "abstract" and "without content". Most socialists viciously reject all association with the kind of nonmaterialist, non-scientific, ahistorical kind of philosophy you're trying to justify here. We use "metaphysics" as an insult and "liberal metaphysics" especially to sneer at our opponents for trying to draw moral justification from a kind of Platonic realm of Forms rather than from the material needs of human beings. I'm sure you have some thoughts to add in response, but my point is that socialism itself, as usually taught, is not a very good example to make your point with.

Jimmy 10y ago
I'm aware that socialists don't frame their claims as moral claims. I'm not entirely sure if they're correct to do so, but I'm aware nonetheless. I'm also aware that some socialists hold views of agency that render the notion of "persuading someone to be a socialist via argumentation" incoherent. Hopefully such debates don't prevent me from using the history of socialist thought as an illustrative example of philosophy that is decidedly not "abstract argumentation without content". Also, you seem to be unaware of the diversity of thought in contemporary moral realism, if you think that all moral realism is equivalent to Platonism.
- eli_gottlieb 10y ago
  >Also, you seem to be unaware of the diversity of thought in contemporary moral realism, if you think that all moral realism is equivalent to Platonism. I'm well aware of moral naturalism, and ascribe to it myself. However, defenses of "philosophy qua philosophy" and that sort of ilk are almost never about any form of naturalism. If you are a fan of seriously naturalistic philosophy, done well and in accordance with the best scientific evidence, than you probably belong on the Science side of the insipid "science versus philosophy" flame-wars, and your favorite philosophers actually spend portions of their books arguing exactly that. Because they have to, over and over again, ad nauseum. Because otherwise, the Platonism-of-the-gaps people will rush in and declare Platonism About Everything, which is what they really want. So for instance, I think that Derek Parfit really needs to see a therapist, because if you actually assert that "if naturalism were true, ... I would have wasted much of [my life]"[1], then you've got a problem. You should not need Platonism about X, for any value of X; you should be disinterestedly considering whether Platonism is true (I damn well think it's not). [1] -- http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/on-wasted-philosophic-livesparfits-fanaticism.html http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/on-wasted-philosophic-liv...
  - Jimmy 10y ago
    >I'm well aware of moral naturalism, and ascribe to it myself. Huh. Well, I'm an error theorist. ;) >If you are a fan of seriously naturalistic philosophy, done well and in accordance with the best scientific evidence, than you probably belong on the Science side of the insipid "science versus philosophy" flame-wars I don't see why I have to pick one side or the other... I consider my outlook to be thoroughly naturalistic, yet I still find myself frequently defending philosophy to people who misunderstand it. That doesn't mean I support all types of philosophical work that are being done, or that I think all philosophical questions are equally valuable. >Because otherwise, the Platonism-of-the-gaps people will rush in and declare Platonism About Everything, which is what they really want. Who are these Platonism-of-the-gaps people? I sort of see where you're going with this, and I agree with you that a lot of what is done in analytic philosophy is misguided, but I also want to be careful to avoid using the word "Platonism" as a pejorative for everything I disagree with. Thanks for that Parfit quote, by the way. I think that's pretty hilarious.
    - eli_gottlieb 10y ago
      >Who are these Platonism-of-the-gaps people? I would go ahead and label them as the entire "robust realist" school of thought in meta-ethics, and we can then throw in large portions of the people doing philosophy of mathematics (the original Platonism in modern philosophy), many people's positions on semantics in philosophy-of-language (ie: they think of semantics in a way that requires Platonic propositions to exist in order to give semantic content, as opposed to merely pragmatic content, to sentences), and of course the endless droning claims of dualism in philosophy of mind. I would grant these people a lot more charity if they could all get together and agree on what exactly the Immaterial or Platonic Stuff is supposed to actually be, and how it comes into contact with the physical world, not only through supervenience but through some form of actual causation. Instead, since they don't have a unified account of the Immaterial, it looks (admittedly, from the outside) as if they're just working in separate fields and positing various forms of Immaterial Stuff as disparate "solutions" for all the problems they refuse to allow to be solved naturalistically. Naturalism can at least shunt off the hard work of explanation to actual sciences, and when that work gets done, naturalism ends up with philosophical accounts that don't require new and different forms of spooky stuff for each and every thing we want to explain.

Jimmy 10y ago

I'm aware that socialists don't frame their claims as moral claims. I'm not entirely sure if they're correct to do so, but I'm aware nonetheless. I'm also aware that some socialists hold views of agency that render the notion of "persuading someone to be a socialist via argumentation" incoherent. Hopefully such debates don't prevent me from using the history of socialist thought as an illustrative example of philosophy that is decidedly not "abstract argumentation without content". Also, you seem to be unaware of the diversity of thought in contemporary moral realism, if you think that all moral realism is equivalent to Platonism.

eli_gottlieb 10y ago
>Also, you seem to be unaware of the diversity of thought in contemporary moral realism, if you think that all moral realism is equivalent to Platonism. I'm well aware of moral naturalism, and ascribe to it myself. However, defenses of "philosophy qua philosophy" and that sort of ilk are almost never about any form of naturalism. If you are a fan of seriously naturalistic philosophy, done well and in accordance with the best scientific evidence, than you probably belong on the Science side of the insipid "science versus philosophy" flame-wars, and your favorite philosophers actually spend portions of their books arguing exactly that. Because they have to, over and over again, ad nauseum. Because otherwise, the Platonism-of-the-gaps people will rush in and declare Platonism About Everything, which is what they really want. So for instance, I think that Derek Parfit really needs to see a therapist, because if you actually assert that "if naturalism were true, ... I would have wasted much of [my life]"[1], then you've got a problem. You should not need Platonism about X, for any value of X; you should be disinterestedly considering whether Platonism is true (I damn well think it's not). [1] -- http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/on-wasted-philosophic-livesparfits-fanaticism.html http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/on-wasted-philosophic-liv...
- Jimmy 10y ago
  >I'm well aware of moral naturalism, and ascribe to it myself. Huh. Well, I'm an error theorist. ;) >If you are a fan of seriously naturalistic philosophy, done well and in accordance with the best scientific evidence, than you probably belong on the Science side of the insipid "science versus philosophy" flame-wars I don't see why I have to pick one side or the other... I consider my outlook to be thoroughly naturalistic, yet I still find myself frequently defending philosophy to people who misunderstand it. That doesn't mean I support all types of philosophical work that are being done, or that I think all philosophical questions are equally valuable. >Because otherwise, the Platonism-of-the-gaps people will rush in and declare Platonism About Everything, which is what they really want. Who are these Platonism-of-the-gaps people? I sort of see where you're going with this, and I agree with you that a lot of what is done in analytic philosophy is misguided, but I also want to be careful to avoid using the word "Platonism" as a pejorative for everything I disagree with. Thanks for that Parfit quote, by the way. I think that's pretty hilarious.
  - eli_gottlieb 10y ago
    >Who are these Platonism-of-the-gaps people? I would go ahead and label them as the entire "robust realist" school of thought in meta-ethics, and we can then throw in large portions of the people doing philosophy of mathematics (the original Platonism in modern philosophy), many people's positions on semantics in philosophy-of-language (ie: they think of semantics in a way that requires Platonic propositions to exist in order to give semantic content, as opposed to merely pragmatic content, to sentences), and of course the endless droning claims of dualism in philosophy of mind. I would grant these people a lot more charity if they could all get together and agree on what exactly the Immaterial or Platonic Stuff is supposed to actually be, and how it comes into contact with the physical world, not only through supervenience but through some form of actual causation. Instead, since they don't have a unified account of the Immaterial, it looks (admittedly, from the outside) as if they're just working in separate fields and positing various forms of Immaterial Stuff as disparate "solutions" for all the problems they refuse to allow to be solved naturalistically. Naturalism can at least shunt off the hard work of explanation to actual sciences, and when that work gets done, naturalism ends up with philosophical accounts that don't require new and different forms of spooky stuff for each and every thing we want to explain.