4 ms·

Woah Woah Woah, there is a fatal flaw and assumption in just the first couple paragraphs - the bootstrapping problem. If we evolved self in order to predict wha

Woah Woah Woah, there is a fatal flaw and assumption in just the first couple paragraphs - the bootstrapping problem. If we evolved self in order to predict what others feel ... that depends on others having those feeling, but if those feelings in others don't evolve unless others have evolved those feelings, we have a circular fallacy! Who was the first feeler to cause others to evolve, and how did that person evolve then?

wellpast 10y ago
All you need is one instance where one agent mistakes that the other agent feels when that agent doesn't -- and then I think your fallacy is moot.
type0 10y ago
> If we evolved self in order to predict what others feel ... This has quite obvious evolutionary advantages. If you can predict how someone feels or what he might think you can outsmart him in competition for food. You could trick him for trade (e.g. food for tools) when he least suspects that it might not be in his favor. Essentially externalizing mirror neuron processes is much more beneficial in the short term, if you can think how the other person might think. In the long run in order to be successful you also need to internalize you mirror neurons - you need to think how to think about yourself and to start thinking what this person might think about you and what kind of self awareness they could have. You can't just trick the other, the deal is to trick them without them noticing otherwise you end up with prisoners dilemma. Probably those processes could also had led to evolution of language and trade.
- bjd2385 10y ago
  Makes a lot of common sense. The more I read about stuff like this the more ``common-sense" Nature seems. I mean, having this near- or far-future predictive ability gives a species a real advantage among others that don't.
simonh 10y ago
That assumes that a sense of self is required in order to have feelings. I don't think that's true. I do find the idea that a sense of self developed from an ability to model the mental states of others, but I don't think having a mental state requires having a sense of self.

wellpast 10y ago

All you need is one instance where one agent mistakes that the other agent feels when that agent doesn't -- and then I think your fallacy is moot.

type0 10y ago

> If we evolved self in order to predict what others feel ... This has quite obvious evolutionary advantages. If you can predict how someone feels or what he might think you can outsmart him in competition for food. You could trick him for trade (e.g. food for tools) when he least suspects that it might not be in his favor. Essentially externalizing mirror neuron processes is much more beneficial in the short term, if you can think how the other person might think. In the long run in order to be successful you also need to internalize you mirror neurons - you need to think how to think about yourself and to start thinking what this person might think about you and what kind of self awareness they could have. You can't just trick the other, the deal is to trick them without them noticing otherwise you end up with prisoners dilemma. Probably those processes could also had led to evolution of language and trade.

bjd2385 10y ago
Makes a lot of common sense. The more I read about stuff like this the more ``common-sense" Nature seems. I mean, having this near- or far-future predictive ability gives a species a real advantage among others that don't.

simonh 10y ago

That assumes that a sense of self is required in order to have feelings. I don't think that's true. I do find the idea that a sense of self developed from an ability to model the mental states of others, but I don't think having a mental state requires having a sense of self.