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Obligatory post on SCM security that these people still haven't learned from: http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/s
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
Obligatory post on SCM security that these people still haven't learned from:
http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html
Since then, researchers have also made compilers for memory-safe C, many forms of append-only storage, parser generators for secure configs, secure web interfaces, etc. Mainstream proprietary and FOSS havent adopted or tried to build on about any of it outside one or two outliers. And random people can still achieve compromises like this with ease.
Hard to make fun of the Russians for bringing typewritters back given the situation. I also know people moving stuff through high-assurance guards consisting of real-time FSM's on 8-bit CPU's a few bytes at a time specifically because an exploit couldn't fit in the RAM or overwrite the ROM. Muphy's Law says if it's stupid and works then it aint stupid. I'll spare you what Murphy's Law says about Linux kernel or SCM security. Murphy's too profane sometimes.