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If only we had a secure DNS system (let's hypothetically call it "DNSSEC"), where you could put your certificate hashes into a TLS record (to make up a name for

by byuu 10y ago

If only we had a secure DNS system (let's hypothetically call it "DNSSEC"), where you could put your certificate hashes into a TLS record (to make up a name for it, how about "DANE"?) ... but surely if such a thing existed, and for several years at that, browsers would support it, right?

tptacek 10y ago
They would support it. Very briefly. They would quickly discover that it doesn't work well in practice, simply due to spotty DNS connectivity for end systems, and so every TLS site would need certificates anyways, and DNSSEC+DANE would just end up being another set of CAs. Then they would remove support from the browser. It's easy to predict a future that's already happened! Fun fact: if you have a .COM name, guess who becomes your de facto CA in an all DNSSEC+DANE world? You guessed it: Verisign!
- byuu 10y ago
  I'm aware of your opposition to DNSSEC+DANE from previous posts here. Like others, I'll agree it's not perfect. Nothing is. Verizon may sign the .com TLD, but that's fine: there are lots of registration providers that offer free DNSSEC support for you (eg gkg.net). Once you have that, you can convey your certificate hash securely, and thus you no longer have to pay some racketeering jackass company $100-600 a year just to get "*.yourdomain.com" in the common name field. The current reality with DNS is that it's the wild west. All this emphasis on security and yet a DNS provider is entirely unencrypted and hijackable by anyone to send you to an alternate domain. If you haven't visited the domain before, even HSTS/HPKP won't help you.
  - tptacek 10y ago
    The problem isn't that you have to pay to get DNSSEC signatures. The problem is that you have to trust the same entities as you did before, PLUS a bunch of new ones. Why are we beating around the bush with this? DNSSEC is, on its face, a key escrow scheme. Why would we even consider adopting it?

by byuu 10y ago

tptacek 10y ago

They would support it. Very briefly. They would quickly discover that it doesn't work well in practice, simply due to spotty DNS connectivity for end systems, and so every TLS site would need certificates anyways, and DNSSEC+DANE would just end up being another set of CAs. Then they would remove support from the browser. It's easy to predict a future that's already happened! Fun fact: if you have a .COM name, guess who becomes your de facto CA in an all DNSSEC+DANE world? You guessed it: Verisign!

byuu 10y ago
I'm aware of your opposition to DNSSEC+DANE from previous posts here. Like others, I'll agree it's not perfect. Nothing is. Verizon may sign the .com TLD, but that's fine: there are lots of registration providers that offer free DNSSEC support for you (eg gkg.net). Once you have that, you can convey your certificate hash securely, and thus you no longer have to pay some racketeering jackass company $100-600 a year just to get "*.yourdomain.com" in the common name field. The current reality with DNS is that it's the wild west. All this emphasis on security and yet a DNS provider is entirely unencrypted and hijackable by anyone to send you to an alternate domain. If you haven't visited the domain before, even HSTS/HPKP won't help you.
- tptacek 10y ago
  The problem isn't that you have to pay to get DNSSEC signatures. The problem is that you have to trust the same entities as you did before, PLUS a bunch of new ones. Why are we beating around the bush with this? DNSSEC is, on its face, a key escrow scheme. Why would we even consider adopting it?