4 ms·
> You never control a domain Then don't use DNS if you can't trust it? You have to trust at some point. Or create your own infrastructure and convince others t
by okket 10y ago
> You never control a domain
Then don't use DNS if you can't trust it? You have to trust at some point. Or create your own infrastructure and convince others to trust you, if you want more than a private network.
> Anyone who can feed you spoofed DNS responses
The tendency goes towards running your own local DNS resolver. It was not possible in the 90s, but since then both the network and computer got a lot faster and smarter.
DNSSEC has also evolved quite a bit and is the best we will get for long time. I really encourage to have a look again before dismissing it outright.
http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/
- drdaeman 10y ago> Then don't use DNS if you can't trust it? Same with CAs, but I believe it's easier to distrust a rogue CA than a rogue name registry. I mean, if there's a news that some .example TLD is in bed with NSA, Chinese government and Russian FSB - there isn't much we can do about that, isn't it? And I guess most businesses won't go as far as changing their domain name. At the same time, on most devices I saw, distrusting a CA wasn't terribly complicated. And can be done by a browser or OS vendor, with a version upgrade, as well. > http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ Thanks for the link. Looks like an interesting reading.
- 0x0 10y agoIf you can't trust your TLD operator, then you should definitively change your domain name. Otherwise they could fake their NS query responses for your domain at any time and obtain certificates from other CAs during DNS/HTTP validation. You've already lost if your TLD operator is out to get you. Pick a more trustworthy TLD next time. As a bonus, determining the shadyness of a domain based on the TLD is something even many regular end users can be capable of, because it is so visible. End users never look at SSL CA chains, but the TLD is visible front and center.
- throwawayReply 10y agoModern browsers have been hiding more and more of the URL. Yes, the domain with tld is still visible for now, but the trend is to cut out anything that might confuse a user. Eventually it wouldn't surprise me if that included cutting out the URL completely for EV and just showing the validated name. It also wouldn't surprise me if the TLD gets greyed out and diminished compared to the domain below that sooner rather than later.
- 0x0 10y agoNo way. They might as well remove the entire URL bar then. It'd be way too easy to phish if you couldn't tell the difference between .com/.net/.org, never mind all the ridiculous new TLDs like .plumber and .guru.
- throwawayReply 10y agoMobile phones already don't show the URL bar most the time.
- mtgx 10y agoI don't know if adopting DNSSEC at a time when Russia and China will control ICANN, too. But in a way, I hope this makes everyone trust the whole CA/DNS system even less, and they start coming up with real, more decentralized and trust-less systems.
- okket 10y ago> when Russia and China will control ICANN Until then I am very much against start mistrusting DNS as a precautionary measure based on FUD. > they start coming up with real, more decentralized and trust-less systems Sounds intriguing, how should this work? There are some ideas out there, but they all have major drawbacks. So it will take time and a real, present threat for people to start using it regardless of the drawbacks.
- tptacek 10y agoAmong many other problems, DNSSEC+DANE permanently concedes .COM, .NET, .ORG, .CO.UK, and .IO to the FVEY Intelligence Community --- the TLDs are controlled by world governments, as we all know from watching the DOJ use that control to attack file sharing sites. Not only that, but DNSSEC+DANE does this without eliminating CAs. It can't, because browsers can't rely on DANE in the real world, for technical reasons. Previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12383795 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12383795
- Kadin 10y ago> Among many other problems, DNSSEC+DANE permanently concedes .COM, .NET, .ORG, .CO.UK, and .IO to the FVEY Intelligence Community That's not new; it just makes plain what has always been the case. Better to have it out in the open, IMO. The legacy non-CC TLDs (.COM, .NET, etc.) are essentially US territory for historical reasons -- .COM should really be ".CO.US" but the latter will probably never catch on, and the ship has sailed at this point -- and anything under .UK is the UK's, obviously. If you don't want your DNS controlled by a FVEYs country, probably best not to use a TLD that's under one of those countries' control. Setting up something in .COM that's likely to be objectionable to the US government is as unwise as setting up something that the Chinese government is going to find objectionable in .CN DNS space. The idea that the Internet would ever somehow transcend nations, when it relies on infrastructure that lives in the physical world which is dominated by nation-states, was a naive piece of 1990s idealism. The fact that the Internet lets you basically choose your jurisdiction is a great thing, and shouldn't be undervalued. I don't think there has ever been a time when a person in the US could so easily set up a publication that's protected under the laws of (say) Finland, or Russia. (Of course, they do so at their own personal peril, if they live in the US; again, there's no escaping nations, just choosing between them or hiding.) I am not totally sold on the DNSSEC+DANE concept, but the fact that it admits reality as it exists on the ground, which is that the Internet exists of and in the world and not above it, does not strike me as a particularly compelling criticism.
- tptacek 10y agoIt is simply not true that in the status quo, setting up a site under .COM gives the USG access to your TLS keys. As long as you're pinning certificates, governments can't generate fake certificates for your site without burning the CA that they suborned. If we adopted DNSSEC+DANE --- and, make no mistake, we have not adopted it --- this status quo would no longer be the case. The DNS hierarchy has no trust agility. You can't burn .COM; if you do that, you break the whole Internet. The browser vendors can, will, and repeatedly have torched misbehaving CAs, and forced still more into Certificate Transparency programs. That's a capability we actually have today, without anyone doing anything, that we would lose in DANE-land. This isn't a complicated argument. I'm surprised it's stayed live on this site for so long. There are lots of other dealbreaker problems with DNSSEC! But this is the simplest of them.