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That's security by obscurity (which may work to delay the attacker). If an attacker can modify your public keys he can modify your checksums as well. Seems to
by runeks 10y ago
That's security by obscurity (which may work to delay the attacker). If an attacker can modify your public keys he can modify your checksums as well.
Seems to me that a public key should be identified by a cryptographic hash of it, rather than the public keys itself. Then the attacker would need to replace the entire hash, rather than just a few bits, because the hash changes completely just by flipping a single bit in the input.
- caf 10y agoThe attacker isn't making targeted modifications to your public keys, though: they're randomly glitching it, and using the page sharing implemented by the hypervisor to read out and factor the glitched version. Even with say a 64 bit checksum then there's only a 1 in 2^64 chance of the randomly modified key/checksum pair matching. But you could use a cryptographic hash as your checksum if you wanted. I only suggest this not because I think it would be a complete defence against all Rowhammer attacks - it wouldn't - but because the general fragility of the RSA construction means that doing it with any potentially corrupted input gives me the willies. There are other sources of bitflips other than Rowhammer and it just strikes me as a generally good idea not to leak the results of RSA operations performed on potentially bitflipped inputs.