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Traditionally it's difficult for browser vendors to revoke a root CA as they want to grandfather in old certificates, so existing sites don't have the rug pulle
by michaelt 10y ago
Traditionally it's difficult for browser vendors to revoke a root CA as they want to grandfather in old certificates, so existing sites don't have the rug pulled out from under their feet when their only crime is using a crap CA.
Partial solutions include blocking the CA's certs based on the issuance date or insisting they hand over a list of the certs they've issued - but if the CA is going down in flames anyway, they have no incentive to cooperate; they can backdate certs and destroy their own customer list.
My theory is [1] this is one of the side benefits of Certificate Transparency - CT will give browser vendors a list of certs to grandfather in if they decide to shut down a CA against its will.
[1] https://www.mjt.me.uk/posts/certificate-transparency/ https://www.mjt.me.uk/posts/certificate-transparency/
- Buetol 10y ago+1 revoking a CA using the issuance date seems like the right solution
- michaelt 10y agoIt would certainly be better than nothing, yes. But prior to March 2015, CAs could issue certs valid for up to 5 years. So even if browsers stopped accepting WoSign certs with an issuance date after today, WoSign could still issue certs "issued March 2015 valid until to March 2020" and browsers would accept them.
- jandrese 10y agoIf they start putting fake dates on the certs then the nuclear option is the only option. They are in the business of selling trust and they're outright lying on their only product? That's untenable.
- creshal 10y agoSee above, they've already been caught doing that.
- Buetol 10y agoMaybe the best would be to build a whitelist of WoSign certs then, scrap it from the publicly available websites and allow people to submit their own. Then some kind of bloom filter could do the trick I guess.
- buraktamturk 10y agoThe same company also cheats on issuance date to support SHA1 signatures. I heard it on HN on another topic. Edit: source https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/k9PBmyLCi8I https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security... Incident 2 ---------- In July 2016, it became clear that there was some problems with the StartEncrypt automatic issuance service recently deployed by the CA StartCom. As well as other problems it had, which are outside the scope of this discussion, changing a simple API parameter in the POST request on the submission page changed the root certificate to which the resulting certificate chained up. The value "2" made a certificate signed by "StartCom Class 1 DV Server CA", "1" selected "WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2" and "0" selected "CA 沃通根证书", another root certificate owned by WoSign and trusted by Firefox. Using the value "1" led to a certificate which had a notBefore date (usage start date) of 20th December 2015, and which was signed using the SHA-1 checksum algorithm. * The issuance of certificates using SHA-1 has been banned by the Baseline Requirements since January 1st, 2016. Browsers, including Firefox, planned to enforce this[2] by not trusting certs with a notBefore date after that date, but in the case of Firefox the fix had to be backed out due to web compatibility issues. However, we are considering how/when to reintroduce it, and CAs presumably know this. * The issuance of backdated certificates is not forbidden, but is listed in Mozilla's list of Problematic Practices[3]. It says "Minor tweaking for technical compatibility reasons is accepted, but backdating certificates in order to avoid some deadline or code-enforced restriction is not." * WoSign deny that their code backdated the certificates in order to avoid browser-based restrictions - they say "this date is the day we stop to use this code"[4]. If that is true, it is not clear to us how StartCom came to deploy WoSign code that WoSign itself had abandoned. * It seems clear from publicly available information that StartCom's issuance systems are linked to WoSign's issuance systems in some way. Nevertheless, it should not have been possible for an application for a cert from StartCom to produce a cert signed by WoSign. * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it should have been.
- tobias3 10y agoThis is also not very encouraging: > R: Sorry, I don't say it clear, please forgive my bad English since my native language is Chinese. As I said this is my fault that we don't understand the Mozilla policy clearly that we don't think we need to report. But now we are clear that all mis-issued certificate case and any reported bug related system change also need to report. I and every related employee all clear now, then we can guarantee we will do it well in the future. Why we log all SSL certificate from July 5th is for full transparency to let all related parties can report to us in the first time after the certificate is issued. Maybe employ someone with enough English knowledge to read and understand https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/maintenance/ https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu... ?
- cm2187 10y agoThat's exactly the internet equivalent of too big to fail banks. And like for banks it is unacceptable. The internet needs its Lehman moment to become resilient again. We should let a Comodo fail.
- the_mitsuhiko 10y agoSo what is the solution to big banks and big CAs? We are just in the process of collectively creating the biggest CA the world ha sver seen.
- mrb 10y agoWith CT we could in theory revoke big CAs without impacting sites currently using them.
- geofft 10y agoYou need the CA to either have been cooperating with CT all along, or have kept a copy of all the certs it ever issued, neither of which an incompetent CA is likely to have done. Symantec, whom one would expect to be one of the more competent CAs out there, cannot do this: https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-c... But Google did require them to use CT for all new certificates, which I think they are enforcing by assuming Symantec won't lie about the issuance date of new certs.
- ak217 10y agoYou may not be able to immediately spot a bad CA, but the more major CAs buy in to CT, the easier it is to spot fraudulent certs through fingerprint reporting. SSL clients can then choose to have a side-channel trust revocation mechanism. Once adoption snowballs, the overall level of trust in the system will rise. The other problem is that CAs need to be regionally confined in which TLD CNs they can issue certs for.
- 10y ago
- bradleyjg 10y agoGive them a month, publicize in the relevant places, and that's that. If a site gets caught out it's not the end of the world. If they have big money on the line then they can afford to have someone on staff that keeps up with this stuff.
- LoSboccacc 10y ago> their only crime is using a crap CA thing is the whole castle is built upon trust. if you don't punish crap CA and ppl who don't do research first, things will deteriorate rapidly.
- privong 10y ago> if you don't punish ... ppl who don't do research first, things will deteriorate rapidly. Is there a way customers would have or could have known beforehand that this CA was fishy? I agree that the CA should be punished/ostracized, but it isn't obvious to me that most of its customers would have known they were a fishy CA.
- LoSboccacc 10y agoon first google search: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8982013 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8982013 " It's 2015. They're using SHA-1 for everything (NOOOO!). They're based in China, which has just said it wants to ban encryption. It looks like they've messed up OSCP, so even their own cert doesn't pass. Oh, and RC4, TLS 1.0 "
- 794CD01 10y agoPoliticians in the US and UK have also claimed they want to ban encryption. Unless the CA is literally run by the government (which some Chinese CAs are, but not this one), it doesn't make sense to penalize them for dumb things their country's politicians say.
- LoSboccacc 10y agoeh it's a longer quote taken out of context, not my words nor my opinion, but shows it's indeed not a respectable CA
- AlyssaRowan 10y agoI wouldn't say it's out of context, I was clearly stating my worries when this CA was discussed here a couple of years ago. I think something should be done, but it's not my call of course. Given we do have Let's Encrypt now, I wouldn't feel in the least bit sad in revoking the WoSign certs. Anyone affected can, and should, change. It's disappointing to see my concerns back then were well-placed, and there are clear indications StartCom's and WoSign's backends are connected together somehow?! I don't know what's going on there exactly, and someone should definitely find out.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- smsm42 10y ago> when their only crime is using a crap CA. Their punishment would be having to pay for another certificate and install it and using a more reputable one and not necessarily the cheapest one around next time. I think in this case the punishment fits the crime perfectly.
- icebraining 10y agomore reputable one and not necessarily the cheapest one The two don't seem to be linked at all; Symantec's cheapest cert (non-EV, no-wildcard) costs $399 - almost 80x the cheapest ones - and yet they were caught issuing unauthorized certs.
- smsm42 10y agoOh, of course, expensive doesn't mean good. Maybe the cheapest one is the best one. I'm just saying the reputation should be a primary consideration, or at least one of. There should be consequences for bad behavior for CA vendors.
- mindslight 10y agoTrust of a CA doesn't have to be binary - it could be stochastic. Let's say that when a browser wishes to revoke a CA certificate, it chooses a timeframe for a "deprecation period". Before the deprecation period, the CA is fully trusted. After the deprecation period, it has been completely eliminated. During the deprecation period, a browser will possibly pop up an error page rather than accepting the certificate. The probability of this happening increases as the deprecation period advances, slowly "turning up the pain" (likely exponentially or quadratically, for slow initial growth). A reload will clear the error and load the page (or perhaps go through the probability again). Obviously it would be good if the site were notified through a header that this was happening. And user feedback will accomplish the same thing in a cruder manner. Proactive sites would move off before the deprecation period even began. Less connected sites would get user reports and move off early in the period. Negligent sites would see their users migrate to different sites as their functionality got ever worse.
- X-Cubed 10y agoWould that not just encourage your average user to click through the security warnings and ignore them, potentially numbing them to other more important warnings? Users aren't the ones who should feel the pain of a rogue CA, we need the CA to feel the pain somehow.
- mindslight 10y agoPerhaps it'd be better as a series of progressive informational pages than described in terms of certificate rejection. The central idea is that the site will become gradually less usable. If a CA is being revoked, that's pretty close to the maximum pain they'll feel. But suddenly revoking a CA will cause users the most pain - I'm trying to make that gradual. A competent site would react in the first week when a few users got a mild warning, get a certificate from a new CA, then hopefully complain to the original CA demanding a refund and whatnot.