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> "Flexible" does prevent a small class of attacks that are possible against plain HTTP. Or as Troy phrases it: "protect against the 95% (or thereabouts) of tr
by andybak 10y ago
> "Flexible" does prevent a small class of attacks that are possible against plain HTTP.
Or as Troy phrases it: "protect against the 95% (or thereabouts) of transport layer threats that exist between your visitors and your origin"
Would you consider your use here of the phrasing 'small class of attacks' justifiable? If so then you should describe your threat model in a bit more detail.
- lmm 10y agoSure. My threat model is roughly to divide attackers into three categories: 1) Amateurs 2) Professionals not targeting specific individuals (i.e. spammers, credit card fraudsters etc.) 3) Professionals targeting specific individuals (i.e. corporate espionage, government-like threats) Let's go with the article and assume that category 3) is virtually impossible to defend against, and ignore them hereafter. People in category 2 are concerned about volume efficiency - they will perform those attacks that are cheapest per CC#. They don't care about handcrafted attacks against individuals, or even edge networks of a few hundred people. Their main attack on unencrypted HTTP will be passive listening on big backbone connections, which is achievable with their resources, and which "flexible" does not protect against - indeed it makes people much more vulnerable to. Who are the people using Firesheep and similar tools? Technically-inclined students playing pranks (maybe a decent chunk of "threats" by number, but not really a threat you need to defend against)? I just don't see it being used as part of serious attacks. No carder is going to bother. No spam-information-harvester is going to bother. Maybe people with personal grudges who are at just the right level of technical skill? But how common is that? (This can vary a lot - I can see that it would be an issue for public figures with controversial political positions, victims of stalking etc. - but not for the typical "person in the street") In other words I think category 2 is the vast majority of (damage-weighted) threats; the threats Flexible protects against are mostly irrelevant, and the threats that Flexible makes worse are precisely the most important class of threats for most "ordinary people".
- michaelt 10y agoWho are the people using Firesheep and similar tools? There have been plenty of reports of ISPs deciding to "maximise revenue per subscriber" by adding tracking headers [1], injecting ads [2] and proposing to sell their customers' browsing histories [3]; and censoring particular images on Wikipedia by MITMing all traffic [4]. And that's from commercial ISPs - if free public wifi or tor exit nodes MITM traffic, that's not even newsworthy :) Whether you think cloudflare and its backbone suppliers are above such activities is a matter of opinion, of course. [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/verizon-x-uidh https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/verizon-x-uidh http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/header-enrichment-hotmiddle15.pdf http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/header-enrichment-hotmiddle1... [2] http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/how-a-banner-ad-for-hs-ok/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/how-a-banner-ad-f... http://www.infoworld.com/article/2925839/net-neutrality/code-injection-new-low-isps.html http://www.infoworld.com/article/2925839/net-neutrality/code... http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/10/comcast_using_javascript_to_inject_advertising_from_wifi_hotspots/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/10/comcast_using_javasc... [3] http://thenextweb.com/insider/2016/08/03/comcast-isps-should-be-able-to-sell-your-web-history-to-advertisers/ http://thenextweb.com/insider/2016/08/03/comcast-isps-should... [4] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7770456.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7770456.stm
- anon1385 10y ago>There have been plenty of reports of ISPs deciding to "maximise revenue per subscriber" by adding tracking headers [1], injecting ads [2] and proposing to sell their customers' browsing histories [3]. That sounds like a good reason to discourage website owners from allowing ISPs like Cloudflare to run massive MITM operations on billions of "secure" connections all at once.
- lmm 10y agoSure, but the ISP is doing it at their level - i.e. probably between the CloudFlare node and the actual site - in which case Flexible is again helping them rather than hurting them.
- lorenzhs 10y ago
- jfindley 10y agoI think your category 3 could use a lot more division. It's mostly possible for a skilled team to build sites that can defend against targeted professional attacks (e.g. crime gangs) - at the very least you can make your systems expensive enough to attack to dissuade them, and (depending slightly on what you're doing), potentially completely inaccessible to them. It's not easy to do that - you need to design your systems with many layers of defence, e.g. you might design your systems so that that 3 or more independent and unrelated 0days are required in combination, which is likely out of reach/budget for most targeted attacks. However you also included nation states in the category. Defending your systems against targeted attack from a sophisticated nation state is so close to impossible for most groups of people that it shouldn't be in anyone's security model[1]. While I don't agree with many points in the article, there IS a concept of unhealthy security absolutionism (nothing to do with cloudflare, though). Parts of the infosec industry have a tendency to declare things broken and unusable if we suspect possible compromise by a nation state - we should not do this[2]. VERY few users can reasonably expect to defend against these attackers, and telling people not to use $tech because it's suspected to be vulnerable to this is a disservice to users. Note that the above strictly relates to TARGETED attacks by nation states, bulk collection and surveillance is very different, and more practical to defend against. 1: For groups that DO need to defend against nation states, this doesn't apply - but then for those groups there is no substitute to having highly skilled people directly available. A bit of googling isn't going to save them, and thus simply having a footnote of "If you're defending against the NSA, this doesn't apply" is sufficient. 2: An example is the NIST ECC curves such as P256 - around the time of the Snowden leaks, there was some speculation that the constants used for these curves were chosen by the NSA to make them subject to some unknown attack, and therefore some (even some respected sources) advised users not to use them. This, in my opinion, was bad advice for most people.
- lmm 10y agoI split the categories based on my own background - I'm sure there are systems that are worth defending against targeted attacks from professional crime gangs ("3a") and not nation states ("3b"). I don't think that changes the reasoning here - "Flexible SSL" would very much be insecure against an attacker in category 3a. With regard to the NIST curves I understood there was no advantage to using those curves - they were slower than alternatives whose constants did not carry the threat of NSA interference. I agree with the general point that there is some absolutism going around (e.g. I think treating self-signed certificates as worse than plain HTTP is wrong).
- lorenzhs 10y agoCan you provide any sources for your claim that spammers and carders can monitor backbone traffic? That sounds like a very tall claim to me.
- lmm 10y agoNo, just an assumption. There are enough individuals with access, and everyone knows the network should not be trusted and anyone who cares about security is encrypting.