4 ms·
Talking about stack protector providing any sort of guarantee makes me chuckle. Both this and fortify are relatively easy to work around. PIC/PIE are the real p
by AstralStorm 10y ago
Talking about stack protector providing any sort of guarantee makes me chuckle. Both this and fortify are relatively easy to work around. PIC/PIE are the real protection, and but still nowhere near foolproof. Also new Address Sanitizer is not mentioned.
- netheril96 10y agoAddress Sanitizer slows down execution a lot. It should only used for testing purposes, the same as -O0.
- masterleep 10y agoWhat if you care more about unsafe pointer access than speed?
- anon1385 10y agoAddress Sanitizer isn't designed to be used in production. See this thread: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/363 http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/363 ASAN is great at detecting many unintentional memory errors, but it's not designed to thwart malicious attacks. If you need a specific example of ASAN binary being exploited then see: http://int3pids.blogspot.ch/2015/04/confidence-2015-teaser-quarantine-write.html http://int3pids.blogspot.ch/2015/04/confidence-2015-teaser-q...
- AstralStorm 10y agoCorrect, but it still prevents a large set of attacks. Instead, we need an equivalent that is more focused on security than bug detection. CPI is the mechanism for the future with somewhere below 10% overhead.
- AstralStorm 10y agoThis just shows how much unchecked access is done in any given application. Asan is still much faster than for instance Valgrind. Plus there are some parts that are actually static analysis, those have no impact on runtime.
- viraptor 10y ago> stack protector providing any sort of guarantee makes me chuckle. Why? stack protector prevents overwriting returns and it works. It won't stop overwriting data and that's known. Would you turn it off when compiling anything?
- rdtsc 10y ago> Talking about stack protector providing any sort of guarantee makes me chuckle. Do you mean it is useless for security, bugs or both?
- AstralStorm 10y agoFor security. In general, even version with stack-protector-all will miss some stack smashing attacks. It catches many simple bugs nicely though. And the version covering everything on stack is quite expensive. Which is why there is stack-protector-most now.
- DannyBee 10y agoCFI and safestack are also not mentioned (safestack != stackprotector)
- AstralStorm 10y agoSafeStack is nice indeed. Especially when combined with ASan. CFI is a research prototype for now, as is CPI. Lack of a formal model of either is very troubling.
- anon1385 10y agoYou shouldn't be running ASAN in production as a hardening tool. The authors advise against it. It introduces vulnerabilities, it's a lot of complex code that wasn't written with hardening in mind, it defeats ASLR, and there are many memory errors it can't detect (which an attacker can use to bypass the checks if they suspect you are using ASAN). If you want to "harden" your code against an attacker who doesn't know what they are doing then it might help. If you want to stop attacks by somebody skilled then enabling it is making you less secure.
- AstralStorm 10y agoIn fact, ASan is meant to be a debug/testing tool, not to be used in production. However, the only way to test something exhaustively is often in production... Heck, there is no good debug malloc style library mentioned either plus flags to disable malloc optimizations present in the GCC.