4 ms·

You can use TLSA PKIX-TA record to limit CA which can issue certificate for given domain. Also, if DANE is deployed, we can ditch CAs for non-EV certificates.

• tptacek 10y ago
  First, no you can't, not with DANE: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/01/17/notdane.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/01/17/notdane.html Second: you already can limit which CAs can issue a certificate for your domain, without forklifting out the DNS: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public_Key_Pinning https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public...
  • deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
  • garaetjjte 10y ago
    Argument that "At the time, some 4–5% of users couldn't lookup that record; we assume because the network wasn't transparent to non-standard DNS resource types." doesn't make sense for DNSSEC, because it requires signed explicit information that record not exist. If server won't return it, then it is broken and needs to be changed. Yes, there is HPKP, but it is "Trust on First Use" and adds entropy for browser fingerprinting.
    • tptacek 10y ago
      Everything adds entropy for user fingerprinting. That argument is about as valid as "DNSSEC is an enormous vector for DDOS" (it is, but so is everything else). Meanwhile: it's "trust on first use" for individual connections, but if you break a pin, your browser vendor will find out. It doesn't matter if a pin is broken for a minor reason or because some CA in Uzbekistan falsified the entire chain: either way, shenanigans get CAs penalized. It's happened repeatedly and will happen more and more.
  • yuhong 10y ago
    That being said, I have been thinking of a DNSSEC2 which would use online signing only to make the protocol simpler for example. And a replacement for DANE that focuses on pinning CAs would also be a good idea.
• deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]