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If you're going to spread the "Against DNSSEC" FUD, it would be useful to give people the opposing viewpoint: http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ ht

If you're going to spread the "Against DNSSEC" FUD, it would be useful to give people the opposing viewpoint: http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/ It's also worth pointing out that DNSSEC enables, for example, improvements to OpenPGP key discovery: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7929 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7929

jcranmer 10y ago
The best argument for DNSSEC is that it can be used to enable specific key discovery (and not in any actual security that it's providing per se). But it's not entirely clear that it's a good idea for that auxiliary purpose. Distributing PGP keys arguably would work better if you had the SMTP server report PGP keys when available (obviously, verification would have to come via external means). It certainly would be far faster to deploy this sort of "useful" service in an application-level protocol that all interesting clients already deal with, as opposed to requiring looking up another protocol that can be harder to access with standard APIs.
tptacek 10y ago
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10019029 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10019029 See in that (old) thread the author's attempts to salvage those arguments. Zach followed up with me after that thread, by the way, and apologized for the tone of the original post you just relayed to this thread. I told him that was unnecessary, because I have no intention of ever being nice about DNSSEC. :) Exactly what I'm hoping for, by the way. Sounds great. A PKI, controlled by the US Government, with 1024 bit RSA at the top, somehow connected to my PGP keys.
- dane-pgp 10y ago
  I don't demand that you be "nice about DNSSEC". :) But if you want to be credible then it might help if you said something more accurate than "1024 bit RSA". http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/#weak http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/#weak "1Kb keys are temporary and the industry is already migrating to 256-bit ECC." http://blogs.verisign.com/blog/entry/increasing_the_strength_of_the http://blogs.verisign.com/blog/entry/increasing_the_strength... "With this change, the root zone ZSK size will match the size of the KSK: both will be 2048-bits. One difference, however, is that the ZSK is changed (rolled) four times per year, or approximately every 90 days. The root zone will not be the first to use a 2048-bit ZSK. Approximately 60 top-level domains (TLDs) are known to be using 2048-bit RSA ZSKs already."
  - tptacek 10y ago
    That's your comeback? "You're wrong, the RSA-1024 is only temporary, and only used at the root of the tree"? The prosecution rests.
    - dane-pgp 10y ago
      If you read the "Deployment Schedule" in that second link, you'll see "Sept. 20 [2016]: The first 2048-bit ZSK will be pre-published in the root zone." Looks like the prosecution might only have a few weeks of rest. :)
      - tptacek 10y ago
        It's the second half of 2016 and the best argument you have for DNSSEC is that they've at least scheduled the start of the removal of 1024 bit RSA keys for later in the year. I'm pretty comfortable with what this thread says about our respective credibility.
        dane-pgp 10y ago
        That's great, but if you really wanted to clear up any doubt about your credibility, could you provide an estimate for how much it would cost an adversary to crack a 1024 bit RSA key within 90 days? You seem to suggest that's a significant threat that has to be addressed before anyone uses DNSSEC.
        wglb 10y ago
        There isn't any doubt about tptacek's credibility. He points out how dnssec puts control in the hands of whatever government controls the domain, and your counter argument is about the strength of keys used to do so. It makes your argument seem less like an argument on the merits of the issue and whether or not tptacek is a credible voice in the matter. Further, to call his arguments FUD takes you further down a path that is not increasing your own credibility.

jcranmer 10y ago

The best argument for DNSSEC is that it can be used to enable specific key discovery (and not in any actual security that it's providing per se). But it's not entirely clear that it's a good idea for that auxiliary purpose. Distributing PGP keys arguably would work better if you had the SMTP server report PGP keys when available (obviously, verification would have to come via external means). It certainly would be far faster to deploy this sort of "useful" service in an application-level protocol that all interesting clients already deal with, as opposed to requiring looking up another protocol that can be harder to access with standard APIs.

tptacek 10y ago

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10019029 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10019029 See in that (old) thread the author's attempts to salvage those arguments. Zach followed up with me after that thread, by the way, and apologized for the tone of the original post you just relayed to this thread. I told him that was unnecessary, because I have no intention of ever being nice about DNSSEC. :) Exactly what I'm hoping for, by the way. Sounds great. A PKI, controlled by the US Government, with 1024 bit RSA at the top, somehow connected to my PGP keys.

dane-pgp 10y ago
I don't demand that you be "nice about DNSSEC". :) But if you want to be credible then it might help if you said something more accurate than "1024 bit RSA". http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/#weak http://blog.easydns.org/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/#weak "1Kb keys are temporary and the industry is already migrating to 256-bit ECC." http://blogs.verisign.com/blog/entry/increasing_the_strength_of_the http://blogs.verisign.com/blog/entry/increasing_the_strength... "With this change, the root zone ZSK size will match the size of the KSK: both will be 2048-bits. One difference, however, is that the ZSK is changed (rolled) four times per year, or approximately every 90 days. The root zone will not be the first to use a 2048-bit ZSK. Approximately 60 top-level domains (TLDs) are known to be using 2048-bit RSA ZSKs already."
- tptacek 10y ago
  That's your comeback? "You're wrong, the RSA-1024 is only temporary, and only used at the root of the tree"? The prosecution rests.
  - dane-pgp 10y ago
    If you read the "Deployment Schedule" in that second link, you'll see "Sept. 20 [2016]: The first 2048-bit ZSK will be pre-published in the root zone." Looks like the prosecution might only have a few weeks of rest. :)
    - tptacek 10y ago
      It's the second half of 2016 and the best argument you have for DNSSEC is that they've at least scheduled the start of the removal of 1024 bit RSA keys for later in the year. I'm pretty comfortable with what this thread says about our respective credibility.
      - dane-pgp 10y ago
        That's great, but if you really wanted to clear up any doubt about your credibility, could you provide an estimate for how much it would cost an adversary to crack a 1024 bit RSA key within 90 days? You seem to suggest that's a significant threat that has to be addressed before anyone uses DNSSEC.
        wglb 10y ago
        There isn't any doubt about tptacek's credibility. He points out how dnssec puts control in the hands of whatever government controls the domain, and your counter argument is about the strength of keys used to do so. It makes your argument seem less like an argument on the merits of the issue and whether or not tptacek is a credible voice in the matter. Further, to call his arguments FUD takes you further down a path that is not increasing your own credibility.