2 ms·

Not sure I agree with the DNSSEC rant. What we trust implicitly are the registrars (and they already manage the NS records for your domain even if you run your

by 0x0 10y ago

Not sure I agree with the DNSSEC rant. What we trust implicitly are the registrars (and they already manage the NS records for your domain even if you run your own primary DNS server), and the TLD and root-zone operators. If you cannot trust the registrars, then all is lost, because if your registrar account is breached (or your registrar is playing tricks on you), then whoever breached your registrar account (or, the registrar itself in case it's backstabbing you) is easily able to validate against any existing CA and obtain a HTTPS certificate. There is no additional security gained by having the CA roots external to the registrars, but it opens a huge avenue for attackers to obtain certificates without breaching your registrar, whether we're talking rogue CAs or evil TLDs. By merging the registrar and CA role (and preferably ensuring that for any given domain, the CA === the domain registrar), you eliminate all unrelated venues of attack. But you've always needed to trust your registrar (and TLD+root-zone operator). TL;DR: If DNS is untrustworthy then so is the current broken CA system because it emails validation tokens based on DNS MX records.

tptacek 10y ago
The post directly addresses this concern. I'll stick by those arguments. But I'll add these: by merging the registrar and the CA role, two things immediately happen: * The FVEY IC gains de jure control over the TLS keys all of the Internet's most important sites, including (along with the COMs and NETs and CO.UKs) every .IO host. * It immediately becomes impossible for Google to use CA-level revocation to punish shenanigans (Google can't "revoke" .COM, or, for that matter, leave it.) It is mind-boggling to me that a community that is so animated by the Snowden disclosures and the leaks of the Equation Group exploits could entertain the idea of DNSSEC even for a moment.
- 0x0 10y ago
  If registrars were the only valid CA for a domain and clients could somehow validate this, then we'd remove the "insecure SMTP" from the equation. Also I wouldn't mind people thinking twice about the implications of using .ly and others as their home on the internet. Why shouldn't geopolitical TLDs mean something? It would allow end users to make a more informed decision on trusting a particular website, more than today's system. We would still allow multiple registars for both generic TLDs and national TLDs. And Google could very well implement a blacklist for registrars that have turned out to be mischievous, similar to the safe browsing service they already have. Or the TLD operators could kick out the unserious registrars from their TLD registry. And domain registrants would shun unserious registrars like crazy if google started blacklisting particular registrars. Edit: To clarify, a "registrar" is not a TLD operator but one of many companies with access to the TLD database, taking domain registrations on behalf of the TLD. I think it's important that TLDs still delegate registration to multiple independent, approved registrars like it is today. Edit2: Today, you are trusting: (#1.) that the registrar or TLD operator or root zone operator doesn't fool around with your NS records or they could redirect SSL purchases to themselves for your domain and (#2.) that not a single CA in the world produces an improper certificate for your domain regardless of #1. With my suggestion, you no longer need to trust #2, but you still need to trust #1. Which is better than today's situation.
- AndyMcConachie 10y ago
  Could you elaborate on the link between DNSSEC and the FVEY? > * The FVEY IC gains de jure control over the TLS keys all of the Internet's most important sites, including (along with the COMs and NETs and CO.UKs) every .IO host. Please prove the above assertion. Everytime I see you post something about DNSSEC I ask you these same questions and I've never gotten a response from you that elucidates this link. What is it exactly about DNSSEC that you think it gives controls to world governments? Spell it out for me in as much detail as possible.
  - tptacek 10y ago
    I remain confused by this question. The USG controls COM, ORG, NET, and US. The UK government, host of GCHQ, the world's most unhinged SIGINT agency, controls CO.UK, NET.UK, and IO.
    - AndyMcConachie 10y ago
      > The USG controls COM, ORG, NET, and US. Verisign is the registry for .com and .net. PIR is the registry for .org. Neustar is the registry for .us. What exactly do you mean by the US controls them? Do you mean that because they are on US property and operate in a US jurisdiction that the USG controls them? In that case wouldn't it be fair to say that any US concern operating in USG jurisdiction(e.g. Comodo, Google, Mozilla, Let's Encrypt) are also controlled by the USG? Or is there something specific about DNS registries that makes them special?
  - ChoHag 10y ago
    DNSSEC is adding a cryptographic-trust-negotion layer to DNS. Governments are in control of DNS, ergo governments would be in control of the new layer which DNSSEC adds to it. DNSSEC is adding a means of cryptographically verifying the government control already implicit in DNS. The way to keep government controls away from your own cryptographic trust negotiation is not to not implement DNSSEC but to implement your own DNS root with its own DNSSEC* , or to implement your own orthogonal trust negotiation such as the various PKI models currently in use. [* ] Before anyone argues, this is exactly what you do when you host a domain in your own DNS server. The vast majority simply defer the rest of the DNS to 3rd party resolvers. I'm sure DNSSEC is able to cope with a situation wherein you own and host only a subdomain and keep the DNS hierarchy above you from being able to override or in any way interfere with your DNSSEC controls.

by 0x0 10y ago

tptacek 10y ago

The post directly addresses this concern. I'll stick by those arguments. But I'll add these: by merging the registrar and the CA role, two things immediately happen: * The FVEY IC gains de jure control over the TLS keys all of the Internet's most important sites, including (along with the COMs and NETs and CO.UKs) every .IO host. * It immediately becomes impossible for Google to use CA-level revocation to punish shenanigans (Google can't "revoke" .COM, or, for that matter, leave it.) It is mind-boggling to me that a community that is so animated by the Snowden disclosures and the leaks of the Equation Group exploits could entertain the idea of DNSSEC even for a moment.

0x0 10y ago
If registrars were the only valid CA for a domain and clients could somehow validate this, then we'd remove the "insecure SMTP" from the equation. Also I wouldn't mind people thinking twice about the implications of using .ly and others as their home on the internet. Why shouldn't geopolitical TLDs mean something? It would allow end users to make a more informed decision on trusting a particular website, more than today's system. We would still allow multiple registars for both generic TLDs and national TLDs. And Google could very well implement a blacklist for registrars that have turned out to be mischievous, similar to the safe browsing service they already have. Or the TLD operators could kick out the unserious registrars from their TLD registry. And domain registrants would shun unserious registrars like crazy if google started blacklisting particular registrars. Edit: To clarify, a "registrar" is not a TLD operator but one of many companies with access to the TLD database, taking domain registrations on behalf of the TLD. I think it's important that TLDs still delegate registration to multiple independent, approved registrars like it is today. Edit2: Today, you are trusting: (#1.) that the registrar or TLD operator or root zone operator doesn't fool around with your NS records or they could redirect SSL purchases to themselves for your domain and (#2.) that not a single CA in the world produces an improper certificate for your domain regardless of #1. With my suggestion, you no longer need to trust #2, but you still need to trust #1. Which is better than today's situation.
AndyMcConachie 10y ago
Could you elaborate on the link between DNSSEC and the FVEY? > * The FVEY IC gains de jure control over the TLS keys all of the Internet's most important sites, including (along with the COMs and NETs and CO.UKs) every .IO host. Please prove the above assertion. Everytime I see you post something about DNSSEC I ask you these same questions and I've never gotten a response from you that elucidates this link. What is it exactly about DNSSEC that you think it gives controls to world governments? Spell it out for me in as much detail as possible.
- tptacek 10y ago
  I remain confused by this question. The USG controls COM, ORG, NET, and US. The UK government, host of GCHQ, the world's most unhinged SIGINT agency, controls CO.UK, NET.UK, and IO.
  - AndyMcConachie 10y ago
    > The USG controls COM, ORG, NET, and US. Verisign is the registry for .com and .net. PIR is the registry for .org. Neustar is the registry for .us. What exactly do you mean by the US controls them? Do you mean that because they are on US property and operate in a US jurisdiction that the USG controls them? In that case wouldn't it be fair to say that any US concern operating in USG jurisdiction(e.g. Comodo, Google, Mozilla, Let's Encrypt) are also controlled by the USG? Or is there something specific about DNS registries that makes them special?
- ChoHag 10y ago
  DNSSEC is adding a cryptographic-trust-negotion layer to DNS. Governments are in control of DNS, ergo governments would be in control of the new layer which DNSSEC adds to it. DNSSEC is adding a means of cryptographically verifying the government control already implicit in DNS. The way to keep government controls away from your own cryptographic trust negotiation is not to not implement DNSSEC but to implement your own DNS root with its own DNSSEC* , or to implement your own orthogonal trust negotiation such as the various PKI models currently in use. [* ] Before anyone argues, this is exactly what you do when you host a domain in your own DNS server. The vast majority simply defer the rest of the DNS to 3rd party resolvers. I'm sure DNSSEC is able to cope with a situation wherein you own and host only a subdomain and keep the DNS hierarchy above you from being able to override or in any way interfere with your DNSSEC controls.