4 ms·

A minimal first step would be to split CAs out into "per-tld" CAs. It would be a relatively easy change for browsers and ssl libraries to switch to saying "the

by TheDong 10y ago

A minimal first step would be to split CAs out into "per-tld" CAs. It would be a relatively easy change for browsers and ssl libraries to switch to saying "these Chinese authorities are only valid for .cn domains", or "these government CAs are only valid for .gov domains". That wouldn't be as good as something closer to what you suggest, but it would be a lot easier to implement and would help a decent bit. There are of course CAs that would remain global, and this wouldn't help if that's the large majority (Verisign, Digitrust, Comodo would be the obvious global ones)... but I believe there's a super longtail of CAs that honestly shouldn't be able to issue for most country TLDs.

alcari 10y ago
I wish we lived in a world where X.509 name constraints[0] were actually useful, but unfortunately we don't, and I think getting browsers (never mind other TLS clients) to enforce them is even less likely than the various root stores revoking known-bad CAs. [0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10
- wiml 10y ago
  We're closer than we used to be. I think Apple is the only remaining major holdout that doesn't handle name-constraints.
- deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]
tptacek 10y ago
This is one of those ideas that sounds like common sense when you hear or think about it the first time, but falls apart on scrutiny. Ryan Sleevi has done a much better job picking it apart than I can here, but among the numerous problems with it: * The most important TLDs are transnational, and their trust hierarchies back into corporations (corporations, I will cheerfully and without irony point out, who are subject to the whims of the FVEY IC). * It's jingoistic, suggesting we should base trust decisions not on technology or even, really, on policy, but rather on nationalism. * It consigns residents of countries with oppressive governments to total control by their governments, while at the same time making usage constraints based on those TLDs (such as local mandates to use services whose names end in .XX for XX in $bad_countries) much more powerful. * It further promotes the idea that security should somehow be tied to the DNS, despite the fact that the DNS is itself not transparently managed, and is often managed at odds with the interests of Internet users as a whole. * By factionalizing Internet trust, it harms interoperability and also makes it harder to introduce further constraints into the certificate system by essentially declaring up front that we're conceding Internet trust policy to individual nations. * It greatly complicates the security stories of companies that have adopted vanity domain names in random countries, which, whatever you think of those companies (koff! Pinboard), is an unforced error. Of all the things we can spend time on to improve Internet security, this is not one of the better ones.
- r00fus 10y ago
  > * It's jingoistic, suggesting we should base trust decisions not on technology or even, really, on policy, but rather on nationalism. Thomas, I simply don't get the promotion of policy over national jurisdiction. What non-national organization makes transnational policy that is remotely independent of the global constituency (ie, not corruptible or ineffective)? Nations create laws, back them up with armed forces. That's a proven model. The rest is a thin veil of cordiality over a situation best described as "lord of the flies". I predict (sadly) that the Internet will get balkanized in the next 10 years. GFW-style everywhere.
- 0x0 10y ago
  The current system already places all trust in national TLD operators, because if a TLD DNS operator wants, they can fake the responses to NS (and recursively, MX) queries from a CA during the small time interval they head out to grab a certificate for your domain.
  - pfg 10y ago
    That's exactly why the solution is neither the current CA system nor the CA-per-TLD (or TLD-as-CA) model, but rather one with full transparency with regards to issuance and wide adoption of key pinning.
    - 0x0 10y ago
      I did not argue for TLD-as-CA, but registrar-as-CA :)
      - pfg 10y ago
        There are thousands of accredited registrars out there[1], how is that going to improve anything? I don't even want to get into the fact that the majority of them are not ones that I would call infosec companies. [1]: https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html

by TheDong 10y ago

alcari 10y ago

I wish we lived in a world where X.509 name constraints[0] were actually useful, but unfortunately we don't, and I think getting browsers (never mind other TLS clients) to enforce them is even less likely than the various root stores revoking known-bad CAs. [0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10

wiml 10y ago
We're closer than we used to be. I think Apple is the only remaining major holdout that doesn't handle name-constraints.
deleted 10y ago
[deleted]

tptacek 10y ago

This is one of those ideas that sounds like common sense when you hear or think about it the first time, but falls apart on scrutiny. Ryan Sleevi has done a much better job picking it apart than I can here, but among the numerous problems with it: * The most important TLDs are transnational, and their trust hierarchies back into corporations (corporations, I will cheerfully and without irony point out, who are subject to the whims of the FVEY IC). * It's jingoistic, suggesting we should base trust decisions not on technology or even, really, on policy, but rather on nationalism. * It consigns residents of countries with oppressive governments to total control by their governments, while at the same time making usage constraints based on those TLDs (such as local mandates to use services whose names end in .XX for XX in $bad_countries) much more powerful. * It further promotes the idea that security should somehow be tied to the DNS, despite the fact that the DNS is itself not transparently managed, and is often managed at odds with the interests of Internet users as a whole. * By factionalizing Internet trust, it harms interoperability and also makes it harder to introduce further constraints into the certificate system by essentially declaring up front that we're conceding Internet trust policy to individual nations. * It greatly complicates the security stories of companies that have adopted vanity domain names in random countries, which, whatever you think of those companies (koff! Pinboard), is an unforced error. Of all the things we can spend time on to improve Internet security, this is not one of the better ones.

r00fus 10y ago
> * It's jingoistic, suggesting we should base trust decisions not on technology or even, really, on policy, but rather on nationalism. Thomas, I simply don't get the promotion of policy over national jurisdiction. What non-national organization makes transnational policy that is remotely independent of the global constituency (ie, not corruptible or ineffective)? Nations create laws, back them up with armed forces. That's a proven model. The rest is a thin veil of cordiality over a situation best described as "lord of the flies". I predict (sadly) that the Internet will get balkanized in the next 10 years. GFW-style everywhere.
0x0 10y ago
The current system already places all trust in national TLD operators, because if a TLD DNS operator wants, they can fake the responses to NS (and recursively, MX) queries from a CA during the small time interval they head out to grab a certificate for your domain.
- pfg 10y ago
  That's exactly why the solution is neither the current CA system nor the CA-per-TLD (or TLD-as-CA) model, but rather one with full transparency with regards to issuance and wide adoption of key pinning.
  - 0x0 10y ago
    I did not argue for TLD-as-CA, but registrar-as-CA :)
    - pfg 10y ago
      There are thousands of accredited registrars out there[1], how is that going to improve anything? I don't even want to get into the fact that the majority of them are not ones that I would call infosec companies. [1]: https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html