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This reminds me rather of Roger Penrose's foray into consciousness in The Emperor's New Mind. If you wade your way through it, you'll find the tl;dr is 'consci
by Angostura 10y ago
This reminds me rather of Roger Penrose's foray into consciousness in The Emperor's New Mind.
If you wade your way through it, you'll find the tl;dr is 'consciousness must be a quantum thing because quantum things are mysterious and so is consciousness- oh and look at those microtubules in those neurons - you might get quantum effects in there.'
Rather disappointing for such a brilliant man.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- geowwy 10y agoKind of a snide way to dismiss Penrose's work. If our brains are doing things that algorithms can't and QM really is non-deterministic then there could be something to his book. I don't think we know enough to say yet.
- vixen99 10y agoWhat's disappointing is you thinking your one sentence is a trump card dismissing Orch-OR - orchestrated objective reduction. Perhaps better to say that you don't find his ideas on this subject convincing. That at least is not patronizing.
- fdej 10y agoYep. Penrose's argument goes something like this (oversimplified): 1) Turing machines can't solve the halting problem. 2) Humans can solve the halting problem. 3) Therefore, humans can't be Turing machines. There are two problems with this line of reasoning. The first problem is that 2) is unsubstantiated. A human can see immediately that 15 = 3 x 5, but this doesn't mean that we have a magical ability to factor integers instantly. By the frivolous theorem of arithmetic, almost all natural numbers are very, very, very large. We have some ability to analyze formal systems, but the systems we have managed to understand are very simple in the grand scheme of things. Almost all formal systems are very, very, very complex, and there is no evidence that we can understand them all and/or that our understanding process actually is correct (consistent) when extended indefinitely. Penrose's actual argument is of course more technical, and others have made more precise rebuttals. The second problem is that the argument does not solve the problem of consciousness. Scott Aaronson put it nicely: "Even if we supposed the brain was solving a hard computational problem, it's not clear why that would bring us any closer to understanding consciousness. If it doesn't feel like anything to be a Turing machine, then why does it feel like something to be a Turing machine with an oracle for the halting problem?"