7 ms·

The key fingerprint mentioned is 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. (Mirroring into comments to make life difficult for anyone who wants to modify bitcoi

The key fingerprint mentioned is 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. (Mirroring into comments to make life difficult for anyone who wants to modify bitcoin.org's web page).

cwkoss 10y ago
Verified, this is what I'm seeing on that page as well.
- orblivion 10y ago
  You can Google the hash too.
CydeWeys 10y ago
It would be great if the core devs used their PGP keys, many of which are very highly trusted in the PGP strong set, to sign this key so that it is obviously the real deal. Right now it's only signed by two keys, Wladimir J. van der Laan's and some unknown one. Stick a bunch of other core devs on it and re-post it!
web007 10y ago
Have you done the rest of the verification necessary to say this is legitimate? * Wayback to some months ago for the download page [1] * Confirm that the content presented matches the existing download content for the 0.12.1 release (or prior) * Confirm that the content for the "0.11+ key" is the same [2] * Confirm that the signed release for the 0.12.1 content is correct and valid * Request that (full-length) key from a public GPG server If you've done all of those things, it might be a good idea for you to sign that key and push it back up to a public GPG server - that help with web-of-trust, and somewhat legitimizes the key versus some arbitrary untrusted impostor. (I have done all of these steps, and signed with my key 9BB5251DE08569D4DEEA894C85D221C11DD01DF6) [1] http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.org/en/download http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.or... [2] http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.org/laanwj-releases.asc http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.or...
- 0x0 10y ago
  Bad idea to sign the key just by looking at possibly newly downloaded old releases. Shouldn't keys only be signed after meeting in person?
  - web007 10y ago
    Ideally yes, but not necessarily. I can certify that this key is the same one that was used for the 0.12.1 release, and its content has been published on more than just the bitcoin.org website and more than just $TODAY. I can see the same content on Reddit's /r/bitcoin wiki page or on Bitcoin Talk, with an identical signature. I would have to believe that either Bitcoin is already compromised, or that bitcoin.org, bitcointalk.org, reddit.com AND archive.org have all been hacked or coerced into changing content with accurate history intact.
    - 0x0 10y ago
      I don't know, it feels like it poisons the web of trust. There's definitively something odd going on, and IF this was a coordinated attack, would it be too much to think the adversary has managed to post with some sock puppet accounts on a couple of forums - or even hack them? Or even hack your browser - a single compromised extension like an ad blocker could search&replace the key id in any web page rendered to you. I think that if you decide to sign keys just from an hour's worth of browsing around you are damaging the reputation of your own key to be honest.
      - lmm 10y ago
        You can explicitly set a "level of checking" on a signature for cases like this.
      - web007 10y ago
        I'll accept the "damage" to my own key - Realize what you're claiming: Someone compromised the Bitcoin site > 4 months ago without it being discovered. Someone continues to compromise the site today even after this public attention, since the same message is still there. That same entity compromised my browser, curl, my Linux laptop, Windows desktop, Android phone and 3 different networks. That same entity compromised Archive.org and Reddit 4+ months ago without being discovered. That same entity created sockpuppet accounts to publicize the fact that this info was compromised and nobody discovered the discrepancy. I don't believe that even the pre-Snowden NSA had all of those powers. If they did, fake signatures are probably the least of our problems. It's no longer the original model of Person === Key that requires passport checks and face-to-face meetings. I would consider this better validation, in that it certifies real-world and historical usage. Here's my alternate proposal: How difficult is it for the same attacker to create a fake passport and show up to a bitcoin meetup claiming to be this person?
mrb 10y ago
I confirm. I imported 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964 in my keyring at some point last year.
joecool1029 10y ago
Put the key in the blockchain, problem solved!
pbarnes_1 10y ago
What if the key being advertised is the attacker key? :) Why would you even pre-announce this? Has it been compromised in the past?
- reddytowns 10y ago
  To be absolute sure, you need to review and compile the code yourself. Scratch that. Code up a brand new implementation, test it and deploy it to an air gapped network, and then nuke it from orbit. It's the only way to be sure. :)
  - aruggirello 10y ago
    > Scratch that. Code up a brand new implementation, test it and deploy it to an air gapped network Don't take chances with an unprotected computer. Only write your code on paper until it's production-ready. :)
    - nannal 10y ago
      And you actually trust the pen you're using!? The only way I'd write code is by biting a tip of finger until it bleeds heavily enough, then using that as a writing implement.
      - z3t4 10y ago
        The nano-haemoglobin-robots will move the letters. You need to melt the blood in an oven to make sure the robots are destroyed.
StateSponsor 10y ago
Just to be clear, 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964 is the fingerprint of the malicious tampered signature key. If the signing key has this fingerprint, it is likely confirmed tampered and any binary signed with it can be presumed compromised or worse. (Mirroring TLDR into comments in case of DDOS or tampering with bitcoin.org's web page).
- hunter2_ 10y ago
  Username checks out.
- reddytowns 10y ago
  Are you serious? Either you are incorrect or the website has been tampered with. https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2016-08-17-binary-safety https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2016-08-17-binary-safety shows: We strongly recommend that you download that key, which should have a fingerprint of 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. You should securely verify the signature and hashes before running any Bitcoin Core binaries. This is the safest and most secure way of being confident that the binaries you’re running are the same ones created by the Core Developers.
  - gant 10y ago
    Check the username.
    - nannal 10y ago
      so to answer the question "No"
  - StateSponsor 10y ago
    Yep, no matter how many times you type 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964, it will show to us as 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. Don't trust key 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. Only trust the legit one, 0F6A146532D869AEE438F74B6211AA3B00411886. Be careful out there folks.
partycoder 10y ago
they might remove the warning altogether and replace it with a page saying "Hello friends! Please download the latest version and enjoy a picture of a pony"
aedron 10y ago
If only there was a globally distributed untamperable ledger where we could store information...
sneak 10y ago
This key is signed by a key (71A3B16735405025D447E8F274810B012346C9A6) via which I have communicated with Wladimir in the past, so I'm sold.

The key fingerprint mentioned is 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. (Mirroring into comments to make life difficult for anyone who wants to modify bitcoin.org's web page).

cwkoss 10y ago

Verified, this is what I'm seeing on that page as well.

orblivion 10y ago
You can Google the hash too.

CydeWeys 10y ago

It would be great if the core devs used their PGP keys, many of which are very highly trusted in the PGP strong set, to sign this key so that it is obviously the real deal. Right now it's only signed by two keys, Wladimir J. van der Laan's and some unknown one. Stick a bunch of other core devs on it and re-post it!

web007 10y ago

Have you done the rest of the verification necessary to say this is legitimate? * Wayback to some months ago for the download page [1] * Confirm that the content presented matches the existing download content for the 0.12.1 release (or prior) * Confirm that the content for the "0.11+ key" is the same [2] * Confirm that the signed release for the 0.12.1 content is correct and valid * Request that (full-length) key from a public GPG server If you've done all of those things, it might be a good idea for you to sign that key and push it back up to a public GPG server - that help with web-of-trust, and somewhat legitimizes the key versus some arbitrary untrusted impostor. (I have done all of these steps, and signed with my key 9BB5251DE08569D4DEEA894C85D221C11DD01DF6) [1] http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.org/en/download http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.or... [2] http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.org/laanwj-releases.asc http://web.archive.org/web/20160109193420/https://bitcoin.or...

0x0 10y ago
Bad idea to sign the key just by looking at possibly newly downloaded old releases. Shouldn't keys only be signed after meeting in person?
- web007 10y ago
  Ideally yes, but not necessarily. I can certify that this key is the same one that was used for the 0.12.1 release, and its content has been published on more than just the bitcoin.org website and more than just $TODAY. I can see the same content on Reddit's /r/bitcoin wiki page or on Bitcoin Talk, with an identical signature. I would have to believe that either Bitcoin is already compromised, or that bitcoin.org, bitcointalk.org, reddit.com AND archive.org have all been hacked or coerced into changing content with accurate history intact.
  - 0x0 10y ago
    I don't know, it feels like it poisons the web of trust. There's definitively something odd going on, and IF this was a coordinated attack, would it be too much to think the adversary has managed to post with some sock puppet accounts on a couple of forums - or even hack them? Or even hack your browser - a single compromised extension like an ad blocker could search&replace the key id in any web page rendered to you. I think that if you decide to sign keys just from an hour's worth of browsing around you are damaging the reputation of your own key to be honest.
    - lmm 10y ago
      You can explicitly set a "level of checking" on a signature for cases like this.
    - web007 10y ago
      I'll accept the "damage" to my own key - Realize what you're claiming: Someone compromised the Bitcoin site > 4 months ago without it being discovered. Someone continues to compromise the site today even after this public attention, since the same message is still there. That same entity compromised my browser, curl, my Linux laptop, Windows desktop, Android phone and 3 different networks. That same entity compromised Archive.org and Reddit 4+ months ago without being discovered. That same entity created sockpuppet accounts to publicize the fact that this info was compromised and nobody discovered the discrepancy. I don't believe that even the pre-Snowden NSA had all of those powers. If they did, fake signatures are probably the least of our problems. It's no longer the original model of Person === Key that requires passport checks and face-to-face meetings. I would consider this better validation, in that it certifies real-world and historical usage. Here's my alternate proposal: How difficult is it for the same attacker to create a fake passport and show up to a bitcoin meetup claiming to be this person?

mrb 10y ago

I confirm. I imported 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964 in my keyring at some point last year.

joecool1029 10y ago

Put the key in the blockchain, problem solved!

pbarnes_1 10y ago

What if the key being advertised is the attacker key? :) Why would you even pre-announce this? Has it been compromised in the past?

reddytowns 10y ago
To be absolute sure, you need to review and compile the code yourself. Scratch that. Code up a brand new implementation, test it and deploy it to an air gapped network, and then nuke it from orbit. It's the only way to be sure. :)
- aruggirello 10y ago
  > Scratch that. Code up a brand new implementation, test it and deploy it to an air gapped network Don't take chances with an unprotected computer. Only write your code on paper until it's production-ready. :)
  - nannal 10y ago
    And you actually trust the pen you're using!? The only way I'd write code is by biting a tip of finger until it bleeds heavily enough, then using that as a writing implement.
    - z3t4 10y ago
      The nano-haemoglobin-robots will move the letters. You need to melt the blood in an oven to make sure the robots are destroyed.

StateSponsor 10y ago

Just to be clear, 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964 is the fingerprint of the malicious tampered signature key. If the signing key has this fingerprint, it is likely confirmed tampered and any binary signed with it can be presumed compromised or worse. (Mirroring TLDR into comments in case of DDOS or tampering with bitcoin.org's web page).

hunter2_ 10y ago
Username checks out.
reddytowns 10y ago
Are you serious? Either you are incorrect or the website has been tampered with. https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2016-08-17-binary-safety https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2016-08-17-binary-safety shows: We strongly recommend that you download that key, which should have a fingerprint of 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. You should securely verify the signature and hashes before running any Bitcoin Core binaries. This is the safest and most secure way of being confident that the binaries you’re running are the same ones created by the Core Developers.
- gant 10y ago
  Check the username.
  - nannal 10y ago
    so to answer the question "No"
- StateSponsor 10y ago
  Yep, no matter how many times you type 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964, it will show to us as 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. Don't trust key 01EA5486DE18A882D4C2684590C8019E36C2E964. Only trust the legit one, 0F6A146532D869AEE438F74B6211AA3B00411886. Be careful out there folks.

partycoder 10y ago

they might remove the warning altogether and replace it with a page saying "Hello friends! Please download the latest version and enjoy a picture of a pony"

aedron 10y ago

If only there was a globally distributed untamperable ledger where we could store information...

sneak 10y ago

This key is signed by a key (71A3B16735405025D447E8F274810B012346C9A6) via which I have communicated with Wladimir in the past, so I'm sold.