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Spam filters do treat mail between friends differently and this is why spammers switched to hacking accounts (vs creating them fresh) and then spamming the cont
by mike_hearn 10y ago
Spam filters do treat mail between friends differently and this is why spammers switched to hacking accounts (vs creating them fresh) and then spamming the contact lists about 6 years ago.
Reputation is effectively a way to do your token of merit proposal. Reading a mail and not reporting it as spam is taken to be the "vouch" but of course that requires the mail to be delivered. If you open an account at a high reputation mail provider and send, then that's earned reputation elsewhere and it's up to that provider to keep a lid on people trying to abuse that reputation.
> The idea of multiple levels of encryption, with an outer envelope which an email server can read, with an inner envelope for the actual recipient, is another option. Possibly a protocol might request contents must be readable by the server for certain classes of sender.
That's PGP. The assumption behind E2E crypto is that the infrastructure provider can't be trusted, so if you let the infrastructure provider automatically request unencrypted copies of an email then it seems the point is lost.
- wtbob 10y ago> The assumption behind E2E crypto is that the infrastructure provider can't be trusted, so if you let the infrastructure provider automatically request unencrypted copies of an email then it seems the point is lost. The difference would be that I get to choose which emails I send unencrypted. I might have no problem sending the latest Sears or LinkedIn semi-spam back up to the provider, but might have a problem sending the results of a blood test back.
- dredmorbius 10y agoHacking (or spoofing -- Joe-job spam) accounts is an issue. If a messaging system requires some local-only authentication token -- a keyfob or bracelet-generated code, say. Or possibly a token integrated into hardware (EUIDs on smartphones, etc.). Or some mix of the above. "Who are you?" is the most expensive question in information technology. No matter how you get it wrong, you're fucked. An advantage of a many-server, or peer-to-peer system, is that the sending server's reputations themselves are far more individually chuncked out. Gmail, as a spam source (or Yahoo, or AOL, or Hotmail, or ...) is a problem because it's almost certainly nonviable to reject all messages from such a major, centralised, service provider. But if the server operates for only an individual, or family, or small neighborhood, spam-originating issues become both more specific, and more tractable for that site's operators. The two-level encryption system need not be PGP. In some senses, it's TLS + PGP, as session* information is encrypted to all but the receiving host, though alternate systems might be presented. A voucher system -- where other peers vouch for an unknown one -- might be interesting. Incoming mail shows up, receiving server sends a "who vouches for you?" request (either to the originating server or via a DNS-like system). The vouches are assessed. Vouchers' own reputations are on the line as well, and there should probably be some closed-loop feedback here. Which gets to another issue -- a huge part of the email spam problem is the failure to close loops. That's where centralised systems have helped, somewhat, simply in generating enough critical mass to get things moving. But to take as an example (and one I've had massive issues with), Yahoo has a specific format they want their spam reports received in. I'm totally down with that. But there are no end-user tools (at least at my last check a few years ago) which will generate those reports. There's no script I can bounce mail through to generate a Yahoo-specific spam report. And the attempts I've made to self-report spam to Yahoo (a practice I've long since abandoned) meet with multiple levels of cluelessness. This is a problem at any level of messaging infrastructure -- the inability to hold to account either the sender directly, or the sender's infrastructure. Take phone and SMS spam. Spoofing of origin numbers is rampant, and carriers aren't care-iers -- they don't care. "I'm sorry, Mr. Beedle, you don't understand. We're the Phone Company. We don't care. We don't have to." Impunity is the root of much evil.