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>It's not wrong because we find it unsettling -- we find it unsettling because it's wrong You're wrong. In that case you'd have to say that "it's wrong because

>It's not wrong because we find it unsettling -- we find it unsettling because it's wrong You're wrong. In that case you'd have to say that "it's wrong because it's wrong". We perceive murdering a child as horrifying/immoral/wrong because caring for the young is something that was useful for human evolution. For other species of animals this is not a useful strategy an they wil eat/abandon their offspring for the benefit of the rest, in that case would you find it to be immoral behaviour?

foldr 17y ago
>In that case you'd have to say that "it's wrong because it's wrong". No, that doesn't follow. I could say, for example, "it's wrong because the categorical imperative prohibits it." It's true that you must eventually come down to some moral assumption or principle which isn't independently justified, but that is the same for everyone in any field of inquiry. >We perceive murdering a child as horrifying/immoral/wrong because caring for the young is something that was useful for human evolution. Similarly, you can say that I perceive a desk in front of me because perceiving mid-sized objects in the immediate vicinity confered an evolutionary advantage on my ancestors. But you can also say that I perceive a desk in front of me because there is a desk in front of me. That is the causal account that's relevant to epistemological concerns, and the same goes in the case of moral judgments. >For other species of animals this is not a useful strategy an they wil eat/abandon their offspring for the benefit of the rest, in that case would you find it to be immoral behaviour? Most animals don't have a sufficient capacity for reflective thought for questions of morality to arise at all. But for very intelligent animals (e.g. dolphins, elephants, chimps), I think questions about whether their behavior is moral or not genuinely do arise. Certainly, these questions would arise in quite a pointed fashion if e.g. a hyper-intelligent alien species enslaved us. It's clearly not enough to say "they evolved to behave like that so it must be moral." I don't know what to say about these cases, really, but the issue doesn't seem as straightforward as you make out.

foldr 17y ago

>In that case you'd have to say that "it's wrong because it's wrong". No, that doesn't follow. I could say, for example, "it's wrong because the categorical imperative prohibits it." It's true that you must eventually come down to some moral assumption or principle which isn't independently justified, but that is the same for everyone in any field of inquiry. >We perceive murdering a child as horrifying/immoral/wrong because caring for the young is something that was useful for human evolution. Similarly, you can say that I perceive a desk in front of me because perceiving mid-sized objects in the immediate vicinity confered an evolutionary advantage on my ancestors. But you can also say that I perceive a desk in front of me because there is a desk in front of me. That is the causal account that's relevant to epistemological concerns, and the same goes in the case of moral judgments. >For other species of animals this is not a useful strategy an they wil eat/abandon their offspring for the benefit of the rest, in that case would you find it to be immoral behaviour? Most animals don't have a sufficient capacity for reflective thought for questions of morality to arise at all. But for very intelligent animals (e.g. dolphins, elephants, chimps), I think questions about whether their behavior is moral or not genuinely do arise. Certainly, these questions would arise in quite a pointed fashion if e.g. a hyper-intelligent alien species enslaved us. It's clearly not enough to say "they evolved to behave like that so it must be moral." I don't know what to say about these cases, really, but the issue doesn't seem as straightforward as you make out.